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THE TIN MAN NEEDS A HEART:
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE
REGULATION OF BIOPRINTED ORGANS
Linda Foit*
Each day, seventeen people die in the United States while waiting for an
organ transplant. At least part of this need could be met by bioprinting, a
technology that allows the on-demand production of custom-sized organs
from a patient’s own cells.
The field of bioprinting is progressing rapidly: the first bioprinted organs
have already entered the clinic. Yet, developers of bioprinted organs face
significant uncertainty as to how their potentially lifesaving products will be
regulated—and by which government agency. Such regulatory uncertainty
has the potential to decrease investment and stifle innovation in this
promising technological field.
This Note examines how the current framework for the regulation of
medical products and human organs might be applied to bioprinted organs.
This Note concludes that the existing regulatory schemes do not sufficiently
address the specific regulatory needs created by bioprinted organs, which
are uniquely interdisciplinary materials. Therefore, this Note proposes a
new regulatory framework to reduce uncertainty for bioprinted organ
developers and to promote patient access to these bioprinted materials that
might soon serve as safe and effective replacements for donor organs.
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INTRODUCTION
Before long, tin men in search of a heart will no longer need to gather their
friends and embark on an epic quest down a yellow brick road to find a
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wizard1—they can simply visit their local (bio)printshop.2 Bioprinting is a
process in which living cells and other biological molecules are placed on a
surface, layer by layer, to generate a three-dimensional structure.3 In order
to bioprint an organ, cells are first isolated from a patient.4 Such cells may
either be stem cells or cells isolated from the blood or skin that can be
genetically reprogrammed to a stem cell-like state.5 These cells are then
cultivated in special growth media to induce cell multiplication and
differentiation6 into the specific cells needed for the organ to be printed (e.g.,
heart muscle cells for an artificial heart).7 Based on the patient’s unique
anatomy, a computer model of the organ is developed.8 Using this model as
a blueprint, the differentiated cells are then layered onto a biocompatible
scaffold using a printhead.9 By employing different cell types and
scaffolding materials, bioprinting can achieve complex geometric
structures.10 Finally, the bioprinted construction usually undergoes a
maturation step in which the cells form a biological structure that more
closely resembles a human organ.11
Compared to traditional organ transplantation, bioprinted transplants have
significant advantages. First, artificial organs can be tailored to a patient’s
idiosyncratic anatomy and physiological needs.12 Second, bioprinted organs
are composed of a patient’s own cells.13 As such, the risk that a patient’s
immune system will reject the bioprinted organ is very low.14 This is
important because in traditional organ transplantation, patients need to take
immunosuppressive drugs for the remainder of their lives to prevent their
1. See THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
2. See Cassie Kelly, 3D-Printed Organs Nearing Clinical Trials, AM. SOC’Y MECH.
ENG’RS (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.asme.org/topics-resources/content/3d-printed-organsnearing-clinical-trials [https://perma.cc/EV9Y-MEX8] (discussing timelines for clinical trials
involving bioprinted organs).
3. See Željka P. Kačarević et al., An Introduction to 3D Bioprinting: Possibilities,
Challenges and Future Aspects, MATERIALS, Nov. 6, 2018, at 1, 1.
4. See Chin S. Ong et al., 3D Bioprinting Using Stem Cells, 83 PEDIATRIC RSCH. 223,
223 (2018).
5. See id. Stem cells are unspecialized cells that have the potential to develop into many
different cell types with different functions (e.g., a heart muscle cell, skin cell, nerve cell, bone
cell). See id.
6. Cellular differentiation refers to a biological process in which a cell changes from a
less specialized type (e.g., a stem cell) to a more specialized type (e.g., a nerve cell). See Cell
Differentiation, BIOLOGY DICTIONARY (June 20, 2018), https://biologydictionary.net/celldifferentiation/ [https://perma.cc/PF7L-CE4Z].
7. See Ong et al., supra note 4, at 223.
8. See Kačarević et al., supra note 3, at 2.
9. See id.
10. See Christina Kryou et al., Bioprinting for Liver Transplantation, BIOENGINEERING,
Oct. 10, 2019, at 1, 1.
11. See Alana Mermin-Bunnell, Integrating Bioprinted Organs into Our Healthcare
System, INTERSECT, Apr. 2, 2021, at 1–2, 3 fig.2; Fulden Ulucan-Karnak, 3D Bioprinting in
Medicine, GLOB. J. BIOTECHNOLOGY & BIOMATERIAL SCI., Jan. 12, 2021, at 001, 001–02.
12. See Kačarević et al., supra note 3, at 2.
13. See Ulucan-Karnak, supra note 11, at 001–02.
14. See Prajna Guha et al., Lack of Immune Response to Differentiated Cells Derived from
Syngeneic Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells, 12 CELL STEM CELL 407, 407 (2013).
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own immune systems from attacking the foreign object.15 Costs for these
immunosuppressive drugs range from about $10,000 to $14,000 per patient
annually.16 More importantly, long-term immunosuppressive therapy
reduces an organ recipient’s life expectancy, because such therapy
significantly increases the risk of infections and the risk of developing certain
types of cancer.17 Third, organ demand exceeds supply: seventeen people
die each day while waiting for an organ transplant.18 In contrast, bioprinted
organs can be made available to patients who would not otherwise receive an
organ—either because no suitable organ is available or because the patients
are not prioritized to receive a transplant as compared to other patients with
more pressing medical needs or larger survival benefits.19 Finally, bioprinted
organs find various additional uses outside of the human body—for example,
for use in efficacy and toxicity studies during drug development or as training
tools for surgeons.20
While the production of a fully vascularized (i.e., equipped with blood
vessels), ready-to-implant, bioprinted organ has not yet been realized, the
field of bioprinting is progressing rapidly.21 Significant advances have been
made in the bioprinting of cartilage and bone, as well as muscle and liver
tissues.22 Researchers have already printed a small, functioning human heart
pump, and bioprinted bladders have been successfully implanted into
patients.23 Further, significant progress has been made toward providing
larger organs with the blood vessels needed for oxygen supply, one of the

15. See Bertam L. Kasiske et al., Payment for Immunosuppression After Organ
Transplantation, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2445, 2445 (2000) (explaining that organ recipients
need to take immunosuppressive drugs “indefinitely”); Nicholas M. Wragg et al., A Critical
Review of Current Progress in 3D Kidney Biomanufacturing: Advances, Challenges, and
Recommendations, RENAL REPLACEMENT THERAPY, May 9, 2019, at 1, 2 (explaining that
immunosuppressive drugs prevent the patient’s immune system from attacking the new
organ).
16. See Kasiske et al., supra note 15, at 2446.
17. See, e.g., Wragg et al., supra note 15, at 2.
18. See Organ Donation Statistics, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://www.organdonor.gov/learn/organ-donation-statistics [https://perma.cc/S67A-NLRV]
(last visited Jan. 9, 2022).
19. See How Organ Allocation Works, U.S. OF DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/learn/about-transplantation/how-organ-allocation-works/
[https://perma.cc/K48S-7JB9] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
20. See Geraldine T. Klein et al., 3D Printing and Neurosurgery—Ready for Prime Time?,
80 WORLD NEUROSURGERY 233, 233–34 (2013).
21. See Kryou et al., supra note 10, at 1.
22. See generally Bin Zhang et al., 3D Bioprinting: A Novel Avenue for Manufacturing
Tissues and Organs, 5 ENG’G 777 (2019).
23. See Mermin-Bunnell, supra note 11, at 4–5 (discussing clinical trials with bioprinted
bladders); Researchers 3D Print a Working Heart Pump with Real Human Cells, UNIV. OF
MINN. (July 15, 2020), https://twin-cities.umn.edu/news-events/researchers-3d-printworking-heart-pump-real-human-cells [https://perma.cc/58B2-G5Q5]; Tel Aviv University
Scientists Print First 3D Heart Using Patient’s Biological Materials, EUREKALERT! (Apr. 15,
2019), https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/498733 [https://perma.cc/JW7V-8NR4].
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biggest challenges in this field.24 Given the tremendous potential of
bioprinted materials to provide lifesaving organ replacements to thousands
of patients in need, the question arises as to how governments can warrant
the safety of these medical products without stifling innovation in this
exciting scientific field.25
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is tasked with ensuring the
safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary medical products in
the United States.26 However, this Note argues that existing regulatory
frameworks are a poor fit for bioprinted organs, which creates significant
uncertainty among manufacturers of these medical products (and their
investors) about how to best prepare for the regulatory approval process.27
Further, it is not clear whether the National Organ Transplant Act28 (NOTA),
which prohibits the sale of human organs, also applies to bioprinted organs.29
Accordingly, to reduce uncertainty among relevant industry stakeholders
while simultaneously ensuring the safety of bioprinted organs for their
recipients, more regulatory guidance for bioprinted organs is needed.
This Note proposes a framework for the regulation of bioprinted organs
that allows for an efficient safety and efficacy review of these medical
products while at the same time promoting innovation in the bioprinting
space.30 Part I discusses the goals of federal regulation of medical products
and organs. Part I also explains how the FDA has based its organizational
structure on the different categories of medical products the agency regulates.
Part II applies the existing regulatory framework for medical products to
bioprinted organs. Here, Part II.A notes that significant uncertainty exists as
to whether NOTA applies to bioprinted organs. Part II.B discusses how
bioprinted organs will likely not be afforded the minimal oversight that
applies to certain cell and tissue products regulated by the FDA. Part II.C
concludes that while bioprinted organs will most likely be regulated as
combination products by the FDA under existing regulatory frameworks,
applying the FDA’s current approach to combination products to bioprinted
organs might pose significant challenges.

24. See Jade Boyd, Organ Bioprinting Gets a Breath of Fresh Air, RICE UNIV.,
(May 2, 2019), https://news.rice.edu/2019/05/02/organ-bioprinting-gets-a-breath-of-fresh-air2/ [https://perma.cc/4YQB-GQTM].
25. Over 100,000 people are on the national transplant waiting list alone. See Organ
Donation Statistics, supra note 18. The three-dimensional bioprinting industry has been
estimated to be valued at $1.95 billion by 2025. See 3D Bioprinting Industry Worth $1.95
Billion by 2025—Increasing Investments in Healthcare Applications, Such as Model and
Organ Prototyping & Production, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 19, 2020, 6:00 PM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/3d-bioprinting-industry-worth-1-95-billion-by2025---increasing-investments-in-healthcare-applications-such-as-model-and-organprototyping--production-301026860.html [https://perma.cc/FT3X-REBU].
26. See What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/Q5PX-J6J9].
27. See infra Part II.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 note, 273, 274–274e.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. See infra Part III.
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Finally, Part III reasons that the existing regulatory framework creates
significant uncertainty for sponsors of bioprinted organs and does not offer
the interdisciplinary review needed to sufficiently warrant the safety and
efficacy of bioprinted organs. Accordingly, this Note outlines a new
approach for the regulation of these innovative materials. Specifically, Part
III.A argues that bioprinted organs do not—and should not—fall under the
jurisdiction of NOTA. Thus, this Note proposes to explicitly exclude
bioprinted organs from the statutory definition of human organ.31 Further,
Part III.B recommends establishing a new FDA center with the
interdisciplinary expertise required to ensure the safety and efficacy of
bioprinted organs. Finally, Part III.C proposes a regulatory framework that
seeks to promote both innovation and competition in the bioprinted organ
space. Specifically, Part III.C proposes to award bioprinted organs with a
long regulatory exclusivity,32 paired with a requirement for the FDA to
disclose manufacturing information for bioprinted organs to companies
seeking to produce generic versions of the organ once the exclusivity period
has expired. In sum, this Note aims to reduce regulatory uncertainty for
manufacturers and developers of bioprinted organs by providing a regulatory
bioprinting framework that promotes innovation and competition in the
bioprinting space, thus benefiting both producers and recipients of bioprinted
organs.
I. EXISTING FEDERAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND ORGANS
Before exploring how bioprinted organs should be regulated, it is
important to understand what federal frameworks currently exist for the
regulation of medical products and human organs. Part I.A discusses the
goals of federal regulation of medical products, specifically the goals behind
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act33 (FDCA) and the Public Health
Service Act34 (PHSA). Part I.B provides a primer on different medical
product categories. Part I.C discusses why developers and manufacturers of
medical products care about which regulatory category their product falls
into. Part I.D explains how the FDA handles the review of combination
products, which have characteristics of medical products falling into more
than one regulatory category. Finally, Part I.E discusses the regulation of
human organs under NOTA.

31. See infra Part III.A.2.
32. Generally speaking, regulatory exclusivities are awarded to an entity that first brings
a specific medical product to market and refer to a time period during which the FDA does
not accept and/or approve FDA applications submitted by competitors for the same active
ingredient or same medical product. See Brandon Burch, Types of Marketing Exclusivity in
Drug Development, NUVENTRA PHARMA SCIS. (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nuventra.com/
resources/blog/types-of-marketing-exclusivity/ [https://perma.cc/2VJN-34YU].
33. Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
34. Ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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A. Goals of Federal Regulations Relating to Medical Products
Medical products are regulated by several federal statutes, most
prominently the FDCA and the PHSA. In passing the FDCA and its
numerous amendments over the years, Congress has endowed the FDA with
immense power to control the market approval, manufacturing, advertising,
and distribution of medical products to health-care providers, pharmacies,
and patients.35 In fact, the FDCA has been called “one of the most important
regulatory statutes in American and perhaps global history.”36 However,
since the FDA’s regulatory power is based on Congress’s authority to
regulate interstate commerce, the agency may not unduly interfere with the
practice of medicine or the practice of pharmacy, which are regulated by the
states.37
The primary goal of the FDCA, passed in 1938, was to protect consumers
from dangerous products.38 In 1962, Congress expanded the FDA’s
authority to require that drugs marketed in the United States are not only safe
but also effective.39 To this day, promoting public health through ensuring
the safety and efficacy of medical products has remained the FDA’s top
priority.40 In the 1970s, technological advances arising from space
exploration resulted in an increase of medical devices marketed in the United
States.41 Although the FDA found that many of these devices presented an
actual danger to patients, the agency was not authorized to take any action on
these devices until after the devices had been marketed under the provisions
of the 1938 FDCA.42 Accordingly, the 1976 amendments of the FDCA
required that manufacturers meet new safety and efficacy requirements
before entering the market.43 Medical devices are now divided into three

35. See Anna B. Laakmann, Customized Medicine and the Limits of Federal Regulatory
Power, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 285, 286 (2017).
36. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 73 (2010).
37. See Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 57 (1911) (stating that the Pure
Food and Drug Act, the precursor to the FDCA, was based “upon the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce”).
38. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948) (stating that that FDCA was
“designed primarily to protect consumers from dangerous products”); David F. Cavers, The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions,
6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1938).
39. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (stating that the
FDCA was amended to “assure the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of drugs”).
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b); Janet Woodcock, Safety, Efficacy, and Quality Remain Top
Priorities as We Continue Our Work to Expand Access to Cost-Saving Generic Drugs for the
American Public, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 13, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/fda-voices/safety-efficacy-and-quality-remain-top-priorities-we-continue-our-workexpand-access-cost-saving [https://perma.cc/G92K-TKMF].
41. See 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.
§ 3:8 (4th ed. 2021).
42. See Margaret Harris, Legislation to Regulate Medical Devices, 3 BIOMATERIALS, MED.
DEVICES & ARTIFICIAL ORGANS 261, 261 (1975).
43. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, and 42 U.S.C.); Harris, supra note 42, at 261.
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groups based on the risk they pose to patients.44 The 1976 amendments also
imposed regulatory requirements that are proportional to the degree of risk
posed by each device class.45
The 1962 and 1976 FDCA amendments concluded the FDA’s
transformation from a reactive policeman to a proactive gatekeeper.46 As a
result of these amendments, the (legal) marketing of a medical product in the
United States is now impossible without the FDA’s preapproval.47 This
transformation was not without criticism, however.48 Some commentators
have argued that the FDA has taken its gatekeeping role too far, accusing the
agency of hampering innovation and precluding patients from receiving
access to novel treatments.49 Further, lawmakers have come to appreciate
that patients will only benefit from safe and effective medical technologies if
companies are sufficiently motivated to actually develop them.50
Accordingly, many of the more recent FDCA amendments were explicitly
aimed at fostering technological innovation and promoting competition
among manufacturers of medical products.51 For example, Congress has
passed legislation to incentivize manufacturers to develop drugs for the
treatment of rare diseases, stimulate innovation, and accelerate patient access
to breakthrough medical technologies.52 Similarly, both the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 198453 (“Hatch-Waxman
Act”) and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 200954
(“Biologics Act”) had two primary goals: (1) promoting innovation in
pharmaceutical research and development and (2) increasing patient access
to cheaper follow-on drugs.55
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c.
45. See id.
46. See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1776 (1996).
47. See id. at 1753.
48. See id. at 1754 n.2.
49. For a good overview of the debate, see generally id. See also Henry G. Grabowski &
John M. Vernon, Consumer Protection Regulation in Ethical Drugs, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 359
(1977); William M. Wardell, Introduction of New Therapeutic Drugs in the United States and
Great Britain: An International Comparison, 14 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS
773 (1973).
50. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360aa note (“Congressional Findings”).
51. See Selected Amendments to the FD&C Act, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 29,
2018), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/laws-enforced-fda/selected-amendmentsfdc-act [https://perma.cc/VHU4-GPR4].
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aa note (“Congressional Findings”); id. §§ 356, 393 note
(“Advancing Regulatory Science To Promote Public Health Innovation”); 21st Century Cures
Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 3001–3102, 130 Stat. 1033, 1083–156 (2016) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42 U.S.C.); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS—DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 1
(2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/86377/download [https://perma.cc/8QDH-ZGTS].
53. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
54. Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. VII, §§ 7001–7003, 124 Stat. 804, 804–21 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
55. See Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005); H.R. REP. NO.
98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984); Henry Grabowski & Erika Lietzan, FDA Regulation of
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The FDCA is not the only federal statute relevant to medical product
regulation. Certain medical products, including antibodies, cells, and tissues
are also regulated under the PHSA.56 Similar to the FDCA, the PHSA’s main
goal is to ensure that biologics marketed in the United States are safe, pure,
and potent.57 Further, Congress passed the PHSA in 1944, inter alia, to
provide grants to advance medical and public health science to benefit the
public.58
In short, the primary goal of medical product legislation and regulation is
protecting public health by ensuring the safety and efficacy of medical
products. Additionally, Congress sought to promote innovation, increase
competition among manufacturers, and expand patient access to medicines.
B. Regulatory Categories of Medical Products
To streamline the regulatory approval process, Congress has created a
regulatory framework, based on medical product categories, that accounts for
the specific regulatory considerations that different products will demand.59
For this Note’s purposes, the most relevant regulatory categories are (1)
drugs; (2) biological products; (3) medical devices; and (4) human cells,
tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products (“cell and tissue products”).60
Regulatory requirements concerning safety, effectiveness for the intended
use, manufacturing methods, and labeling differ significantly among these
categories.61
Drugs are articles (other than food) intended to be used for treating, curing,
preventing, or diagnosing disease in human or other animals.62 Drugs are
specifically intended to affect the structure or function of the human or
animal body.63 Because the statutory definition of drug is fairly broad, the
definition technically also encompasses biologics and medical devices.64 For
Biosimilars, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING
DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 414, 414 (Holly F. Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 2015). In
this Note, the sponsors of the first drug or biologic approved by the FDA for a specific
condition are referred to as an “innovator company.” Sponsors of therapies that enter the
market after the innovator product are referred to in this Note as “follow-on companies.”
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 262; What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluationand-research-cber/what-are-biologics-questions-and-answers
[https://perma.cc/VL2BBWZX].
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C).
58. See Alanson W. Willcox, The Public Health Service Act, 1944, 7 SOC. SEC. BULL. 15,
16 (1944).
59. See generally AGATA BODIE & AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11083,
MEDICAL PRODUCT REGULATION: DRUGS, BIOLOGICS, AND DEVICES (2019).
60. See id.; Tissue & Tissue Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/tissue-tissue-products
[https://perma.cc/U82L-L8W9]. The FDA refers to these products as “HCT/Ps.” Id.
61. See BODIE & SARATA, supra note 59.
62. See 21 U.S.C. § 321; Human Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/industry/regulated-products/human-drugs
[https://perma.cc/7FDDSS9X].
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 321.
64. See BODIE & SARATA, supra note 59.
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this Note’s purposes, a “drug” refers to a compound that falls into the
statutory definition of a drug but that is not also a biologic65 or a medical
device.66 Most medical products referred to in this Note as “drugs” are small
molecules (i.e., relatively simple chemical compounds such as aspirin).67
Biological products (“biologics”) include therapeutic proteins, cell
therapies, viruses, vaccines, blood and blood components, and similar
products used for the treatment, cure, and prevention of disease.68 While
most drugs are chemically synthesized and have a known chemical structure,
biologics are customarily manufactured in living cells (or are living cells)
and constitute complex mixtures.69 Therefore, biologics often cannot be
characterized as easily as drugs.70
Medical devices are instruments, apparatuses, implants, or articles used in
the prevention, treatment, cure, or diagnosis of a disease.71 These devices do
not achieve their primary intended purpose through chemical action within
the body and are not dependent on metabolization to achieve their therapeutic
effects.72 Common medical devices include pacemakers and toothbrushes.73
Finally, cell and tissue products are articles that contain or consist of
human cells or tissues and are implanted, transplanted, or otherwise
transferred into a human recipient.74 Examples of cell and tissue products
include bones, skin, heart valves, corneas, and stem cells derived from
blood.75 The definition of cell and tissue products explicitly excludes
vascularized human organs for transplantation and blood or blood
components.76

65. See infra text accompanying notes 68–70 for a definition of “biologic.”
66. See infra text accompanying notes 72–73 for a definition of “medical device.”
67. See Points to Consider in Drug Development of Biologics and Small Molecules,
NUVENTRA PHARMA SCIS. (May 13, 2020), https://www.nuventra.com/resources/blog/smallmolecules-versus-biologics/ [https://perma.cc/MBU5-FZ7Z].
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i). This definition does not list diagnosing disease. See id.; see
also Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (July 7, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/therapeutic-biologics-applicationsbla/frequently-asked-questions-about-therapeutic-biological-products
[https://perma.cc/V4DA-AN62].
69. See What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, supra note 56.
70. See id.
71. See 21 U.S.C. § 321; How to Determine If Your Product Is a Medical Device, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/classify-yourmedical-device/how-determine-if-your-product-medical-device
[https://perma.cc/J6HF7FRK].
72. See 21 U.S.C. § 321; How to Determine If Your Product Is a Medical Device, supra
note 71.
73. See Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 2: An Overview of
Approval Processes: FDA Approval of Medical Devices, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL
SCI. 277, 279 (2016).
74. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d) (2022); Tissue & Tissue Products, supra note 60.
75. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d).
76. See id. Vascularized human organs are regulated by the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA). See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 78
Fed. Reg. 40,033, 40,033 (July 3, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 21); infra Part I.E.
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The FDA’s organizational structure largely mirrors the categories of
medical products the agency regulates.77 To streamline the regulatory review
process, the FDA has assigned jurisdiction for each medical product category
to an FDA agency center with specialized expertise in that category.78 The
FDA’s organizational structure is not static, however. Throughout its
history, the FDA has formed new centers or abolished old ones in light of
technological advancement and statutory expansion of the FDA’s
authority.79 Further, to provide a better match between medical product and
regulatory expertise, the FDA has occasionally reassigned jurisdiction for
certain medical products in response to advancements in regulatory
science.80
Currently, drug approval is overseen by the Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (“FDA drug center”).81 Biologics licensure is generally
handled by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (“FDA
biologics center”).82 Medical devices are regulated by the Center for Devices
and Radiological Health (“FDA device center”).83 Depending on their
specific type, cell and tissue products are regulated by the FDA biologics or
device center.84
In short, the FDA is organized into centers of regulatory expertise, with
each center taking primary responsibility for a medical product category.85

77. See BODIE & SARATA, supra note 59.
78. See Howard Manresa & Arlen D. Meyers, Combination Products and the FDA: Issues
and Answers, 2 BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 41, 42 (2005).
79. See, e.g., Delegations of Authority and Organization, 48 Fed. Reg. 8442, 8443 (Mar.
1, 1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 5); Statement of Organization, Functions, and
Delegations of Authority, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,913, 26,913 (June 22, 1982); A Brief History of the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history-exhibits/brief-history-center-drug-evaluationand-research#display_35 [https://perma.cc/V38J-3XAZ].
80. See Transfer of Therapeutic Biological Products to the Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/combinationproducts/jurisdictional-information/transfer-therapeutic-biological-products-center-drugevaluation-and-research [https://perma.cc/7Z8S-HYLV] (noting that certain biologics, which
provide similar effects in the human body as small molecule drugs, have been transferred from
the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research to the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research).
81. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 200–499 (2022) (regulation of drugs); BODIE & SARATA, supra note
59.
82. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 600–680 (2022) (regulation of biologics); BODIE & SARATA, supra
note 59.
83. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 800–898 (2022) (regulation of medical devices); BODIE & SARATA,
supra note 59.
84. See FDA Regulation of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products (HCT/P’s) Product List, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/tissue-tissue-products/fda-regulation-humancells-tissues-and-cellular-and-tissue-based-products-hctps-product-list
[https://perma.cc/BMY7-KW66].
85. See Manresa & Meyers, supra note 78, at 42.
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C. Why FDA Regulatory Categories Matter to Sponsors
Sponsors86 care significantly about which category their medical product
falls into.87 First, the stringency of the regulatory review process (and thus
the time and costs involved in obtaining FDA approval) differs significantly
among different categories of medical products.88 Further, Congress offers
certain financial incentives like regulatory exclusivities to sponsors of some,
but not all, medical products.89 As such, the choice of regulatory category is
an important financial consideration for sponsors and their investors.
1. Stringency of the Scientific and Regulatory Review Process
Drugs, biologics, and medical devices all require premarket approval,
meaning that manufacturers need to obtain the FDA’s permission before
marketing their product.90 Generally, drugs and biologics face a more
stringent premarket review than medical devices.91 Although the approval
pathways for biologics and drugs are similar, it is generally easier for
manufacturers of follow-on drugs (“generics”) compared to sponsors of
follow-on biologics (“biosimilars”) to take advantage of certain abbreviated
FDA approval pathways.92 Finally, certain cell and tissue products are
exempt from premarket approval, while others require full premarket
review.93
Medical devices are classified based on the degree of risk they pose to
consumers.94 Most relevant for this Note are Class III devices, which are
products that sustain or support life, that are implanted, or that present a
potentially unreasonable risk of illness or injury.95 Sponsors of Class III
devices need to provide “reasonable assurance” that the device is both safe
and effective.96 Effectiveness must be based on well-controlled studies,
which can include clinical data or, if appropriate, bench testing or animal
studies.97 Finally, manufacturers of medical devices benefit from the “least
burdensome principle,” meaning that sponsors are only required to provide
86. A “sponsor” is a person initiating and taking responsibility for a clinical investigation
(e.g., a pharmaceutical company, a government agency, or an academic institution). See 21
C.F.R. § 312.3 (2022).
87. See infra Parts I.C.1, I.C.2.
88. See infra Part I.C.1.
89. See infra Part I.C.2.
90. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
91. See BODIE & SARATA, supra note 59.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 106–19. See supra note 55 for definitions of
“innovator company” and “follow-on company.”
93. See infra text accompanying notes 120–24.
94. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a); How to Study and Market Your Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensiveregulatory-assistance/how-study-and-market-your-device [https://perma.cc/NN2U-6XR7].
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
96. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c)(1) (2022).
97. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(2) (2022); PMA Clinical Studies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(May 22, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-approval-pma/pmaclinical-studies#determination [https://perma.cc/ESR4-ZXMW].
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the minimum amount of information that adequately addresses any
regulatory questions raised by the FDA.98
There are significant similarities between the drug and the biologics
approval pathways.99 For example, the overall stringency of the safety and
efficacy review processes for drugs and biologics is very similar.100 Both
review processes are more burdensome and costly for sponsors than the
medical device review process.101 Additionally, when it comes to efficacy,
sponsors of drugs will need to provide “substantial evidence” (as opposed to
only the “reasonable assurance” that is required for medical devices) that the
drug will have the intended therapeutic effect.102 Similarly, sponsors of
biologics need to show that their medical product is “safe, pure, and
potent.”103 Here, the FDA construes potency to include effectiveness.104 For
both drugs and biologics, a showing of effectiveness usually requires both
clinical trials and preclinical studies.105
One practical area in which the approval pathways for drug and biologics
differ is that it is easier for generics manufacturers (compared to biologics
manufacturers) to rely on the innovator’s clinical data as part of the follow-on
manufacturer’s own FDA application.106 Congress incentivizes innovator
companies to take on the costly development of novel drugs and biologics by
granting regulatory exclusivities, which are essentially periods of
government-sanctioned monopolies.107 Once the monopoly period has
expired, follow-on manufacturers benefit from an accelerated approval
process in which they can partially or fully rely on the safety and efficacy
data generated by the innovator company.108 Such data reuse significantly
reduces the cost of obtaining regulatory approval for sponsors of follow-on
products and further reduces the number of unnecessary clinical trials.109

98. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THE LEAST BURDENSOME PROVISIONS: CONCEPT AND
PRINCIPLES 4–5 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/73188/download [https://perma.cc/
VM7S-KRHM].
99. See BODIE & SARATA, supra note 59.
100. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 note (“Special Rule”) (instructing the FDA to minimize the
differences between the drug and biologics review processes).
101. See BODIE & SARATA, supra note 59.
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); supra note 96.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2).
104. See 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(s) (2022).
105. See generally INST. OF MED., COMM. ON ACCELERATING RARE DISEASES RSCH. &
ORPHAN PROD. DEV., Development of New Therapeutic Drugs and Biologics for Rare
Diseases, in RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS 147 (Marylin J. Field & Thomas F. Boat
eds., 2010).
106. See generally Yaniv Heled, Follow-On Biologics Are Set Up to Fail, U. ILL. L. REV.
ONLINE 113 (2018).
107. See infra Part I.C.2.
108. See Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 14,
2022), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-new-drug-application-anda
[https://perma.cc/A8EQ-XQFM]; Biosimilar Development, Review, and Approval, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilardevelopment-review-and-approval [https://perma.cc/XRT6-TRM9].
109. See Biosimilar Development, Review, and Approval, supra note 108.
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Finally, patients benefit because increased competition among
pharmaceutical companies usually results in lower drug prices.110
To take advantage of the abbreviated review process for a generic,
manufacturers need to show that (1) the generic contains the same active
ingredient as the innovator drug; (2) the two products have the same route of
administration, dosage form, and strength; and (3) the generic drug is
expected to have the same therapeutic effect as the original product when
administered to a patient.111 These requirements can often be met relatively
easily without the need to run clinical trials.112
Biologics are much more complex than small molecule drugs, and the
process for manufacturing them can significantly influence a biologic’s
therapeutic activity.113 To utilize the abbreviated review process for a
biosimilar (i.e., a follow-on biologic), manufacturers need to demonstrate
that their product is “highly similar” to the innovator biologic and that there
are no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and
the innovator product in regard to safety, purity, and potency.114 However,
without precise knowledge of the hundreds of steps involved in making the
innovator biologic, it is nearly impossible for a follow-on manufacturer to
produce an identical copy of the innovator product.115 While innovator
companies share their manufacturing protocols with the FDA as part of their
biologics license application, the FDA cannot disclose this proprietary
information to biosimilar manufacturers under the FDA’s confidentiality
policies.116 Additionally, the FDA may not even compare the manufacturing
processes for the innovator and the follow-on drug when internally reviewing
the marketing application submitted by a follow-on manufacturer.117
Accordingly, biosimilar manufacturers not only need to develop their own
manufacturing process, they further have to conduct clinical trials to
demonstrate biosimilarity.118 As a result, the development of a biosimilar is
significantly more expensive and takes more time than the development of a
generic.119

110. See RYAN CONRAD & RANDALL LUTTER, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERIC
COMPETITION AND DRUG PRICES: NEW EVIDENCE LINKING GREATER GENERIC COMPETITION
AND LOWER GENERIC DRUG PRICES 1 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/133509/download
[https://perma.cc/FZ3Q-DEWU].
111. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2).
112. See Heled, supra note 106, at 120.
113. See Frequently Asked Questions About Therapeutic Biological Products, supra note
68.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k).
115. See Yaniv Heled, The Case for Disclosure of Biologics Manufacturing Information,
47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 54, 56 (2019).
116. See id. at 54.
117. See id. at 56.
118. See Biosimilar Development, Review, and Approval, supra note 108.
119. See Biosimilars vs. Generics:
What’s the Difference?, PFIZER,
https://www.pfizer.com/sites/default/files/investors/financial_reports/annual_reports/2018/o
ur-innovation/progressing-our-science/biosimilars-vs-generics/index.html [https://perma.cc/
6QHT-PZRN] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022) (noting that the development of a biologic costs more
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Finally, some—but not all—cell and tissue products are subject to the
same stringent safety and efficacy review that the FDA applies to drugs and
biologics under the FDCA.120 Certain cell and tissue products that pose a
lower safety risk are not subject to premarket review, and their sponsors only
need to comply with certain registration, manufacturing, and reporting
requirements under the PHSA.121 Cellular products are only low-risk if they
are “minimally manipulated,” meaning that the cells contained in the product
did not undergo a type of processing that changes the cells’ original relevant
characteristics.122 Further, the cell or tissue cannot be combined with another
article (except for water or certain substances such as sterilizing or storage
agents).123 Accordingly, cell and tissue products that are more than just
minimally manipulated (e.g., genetically modified) and/or cell and tissue
products that are combined with another article (e.g., a scaffold) undergo a
stricter regulatory review and require FDA approval to market.124
In short, the FDA’s requirement for ensuring the safety and efficacy of a
medical product significantly depends on which category the product falls
into. Biologics and drugs generally face a more stringent regulatory review
than medical devices, and some cell and tissue products are exempt from
premarket review altogether.
2. Regulatory Exclusivities
Congress uses regulatory exclusivities as financial “carrots” to reward
innovator companies for developing certain new medical products and
bringing them to market.125 The most valuable exclusivity type is “market
exclusivity,” which refers to a time period during which an innovator
company is granted an exclusive right by the FDA to commercialize the
company’s product.126 During this time, the FDA will generally not accept

than $100 million and may take five to nine years, whereas the development of a generic drug
“only” costs $1 million to $2 million and takes about two years).
120. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS FOR HUMAN CELLS,
TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS: MINIMAL MANIPULATION AND
HOMOLOGOUS
USE
2–4
(2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/109176/download
[https://perma.cc/FL6F-X8EJ].
121. These lower risk cell and tissue products are regulated solely under section 261 of the
PHSA (42 U.S.C. § 264) and 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2022). See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra
note 120, at 2–3. For example, if a manufacturer removes the outer layer from skin and
freeze-dries the remaining connective tissue, the resulting product will likely not be subject to
premarket review. See id. at 12–13.
122. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(f) (2022); 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(a) (2022).
123. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(a).
124. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.20 (2022) (explaining that cell and tissue products that do not
meet the exemption criteria provided in 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(a) will be regulated as a drug,
biological, or medical device).
125. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 7-5700, REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITY
REFORM IN THE 115TH CONGRESS (2017); Sarah Hennebry, When a 20 Year Patent Term Just
Isn’t Enough: Market and Data Exclusivity, FPA PAT. ATT’YS (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.fpapatents.com/resource?id=483 [https://perma.cc/9WAQ-NAYR].
126. See Hennebry, supra note 125.
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any applications by follow-on companies.127 As a practical matter, this
means that the innovator company can charge significantly higher prices
during this time period than the company would be able to with competitors
in the market.128 “Data exclusivity” refers to a time period in which
follow-on companies are prevented from utilizing an abbreviated FDA
approval pathway that would allow the follow-on company to rely on certain
clinical and other safety information previously submitted by the innovator
drug company for the purposes of obtaining regulatory approval.129 Followon companies are, of course, free to generate their own clinical safety and
efficacy data and seek approval through the regular review process.130
However, since the latter is significantly more costly, data exclusivity can
still serve as a powerful deterrent to market entry for follow-on companies.131
In general, medical products that take more time and money to develop,
manufacture, and shepherd through the FDA review process are rewarded
with a longer exclusivity period.132 For instance, biologics are afforded
twelve years of market exclusivity, the longest exclusivity period awarded
by the FDA.133 In contrast, the longest exclusivity period for drugs provides
up to 7.5 years of market exclusivity.134 Finally, medical devices, which
undergo a less stringent and less costly review process than drug and
biologics are not awarded any market exclusivity.135 However, certain
medical devices are awarded six years of data exclusivity.136 Congress also
uses regulatory exclusivities as incentives for companies to develop therapies
for specific diseases or patient populations that might otherwise be neglected
by drug manufacturers (for example, because sponsors cannot recoup their
investment due to a smaller patient population).137
127. See Bo Peng & Marta Cavero Tomas, A Cheat Sheet to Navigate the Complex Maze
of Exclusivities in the United States, 3 PHARM. PAT. ANALYST 339, 341 (2014).
128. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., POLICY PROPOSAL: REDUCING THE EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD
FOR BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS
(2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/
09/dsri_policy_proposal_reducing_the_exclusivity_period_for_biological_products.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76F2-LZL3].
129. See Hennebry, supra note 125.
130. See Peng & Tomas, supra note 127, at 341.
131. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
132. See Peng & Tomas, supra note 127, at 341–42.
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (stating that biologics are awarded twelve years of market
exclusivity); Peng & Tomas, supra note 127, at 340 fig.1, 342 (discussing regulatory
exclusivities for different medical products).
134. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(b)(3)(i)(B) (2022); Peng & Tomas, supra note 127, at 340
fig.1, 342.
135. See Erika Lietzan, Data Exclusivity for Medical Devices, OBJECTIVE INTENT
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://objectiveintent.blog/2017/10/10/data-exclusivity-for-medical-devices/
[https://perma.cc/E9U6-TYTM].
136. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(h)(4)(A).
137. See Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA
CONSUMER MAG. (Jan.–Feb. 2006), https://www.fda.gov/files/Promoting-Safe-and-EffectiveDrugs-for-100-Years-%28download%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/S47C-J4US]. For example,
Orphan Drug Exclusivity (seven years of additional exclusivity) is available for drugs and
biologics that treat diseases affecting fewer than 200,000 patients in the United States (or more
than 200,000 and no expectation of recovering costs). See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb; 21 C.F.R.
§ 316.31 (2022). Pediatric Exclusivity (six months of additional exclusivity) is available for
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Whether long exclusivity periods, such as the twelve-year exclusivity
period for biologics, actually encourage or stifle innovation has been the
subject of ongoing debate.138 Proponents of a longer exclusivity period for
biologics argue that the higher costs and increased difficulties of producing
biologics, as compared to small molecule drugs, require stronger incentives
for biologics manufacturers.139 In turn, opponents contend that true
innovation results from promoting competition, not from overextending
monopoly protection.140
However, generally speaking, regulatory
exclusivities can serve as powerful motivators for companies to develop
covered medical products.141
D. Medical Products Fitting into More than One FDA Category:
Combination Products
Not every product fits neatly into a single regulatory category.142 Medical
products that contain two or more regulated components falling into different
categories (for example, the biologic and device categories) are called
combination products.143 When a sponsor submits an application for the
marketing of a combination product, the FDA’s Office of Combination
Products (OCP) designates a specific regulatory pathway for the product (for
example, the biologic licensure pathway) and assigns primary responsibility
for the review process of the product to a single lead FDA center (for
example, the FDA biologics center).144 Once assigned, all components of
the combination product have to meet the requirements of the designated

drugs and biologics when the sponsors conduct pediatric studies. See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b).
Qualified Infectious Disease Product Exclusivity (five years of additional exclusivity) is
available for drugs (but not biologics) that treat certain bacterial and fungal diseases. See 21
U.S.C. § 355f(a).
138. See Henry Grabowski, Follow-On Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance
Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 481–82 (2008);
LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, STIMULATING INNOVATION IN THE BIOLOGICS INDUSTRY: A
BALANCED APPROACH TO MARKETING EXCLUSIVITY 1 (2008), https://esplanner.com/
files/biologics.pdf [https://perma.cc/4S6S-ZYXV]; Andrew Pollack, Costly Drugs Known as
Biologics Prompt Exclusivity Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/
2009/07/22/business/22biogenerics.html [https://perma.cc/S98Z-XEXG].
139. See Grabowski, supra note 138, at 481–82.
140. See generally KOTLIKOFF, supra note 138.
141. See Peng & Tomas, supra note 127, at 339.
142. See 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e) (2022).
143. See id. Combination products are biologic/device, biologic/drug, drug/device, and
biologic/drug/device combinations. See id. Cell and tissue products that are combined with
other components are—depending on their nature—regulated as a drug, biologic, or device.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 120, at 3–4. As such, there are no combination
products comprising “cell and tissue products” as a component.
144. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1); Frequently Asked Questions About Combination Products,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/combination-products/aboutcombination-products/frequently-asked-questions-about-combination-products
[https://perma.cc/QA5X-RRZR]; Nobuo Uemura et al., New Visualization Models of
Designation Pathway and Group Categorization of Device-Drug and Device-Biologic
Combination Products Classification in the United States: Analysis of FDA Capsular
Decisions, 55 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REGUL. SCI. 807, 808 (2021).
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approval pathway.145 A goal of this designation and assignment process is
to avoid the need to seek approval for the different product components from
different FDA centers.146
To determine which center should handle review of a given combination
product, the OCP looks to the combination product’s primary mode of action
(PMOA).147 The PMOA is defined as the mode of action of a combination
product that provides the largest contribution to the overall intended
therapeutic effect of the combination product.148 For example, an EpiPen,
which is used for the emergency treatment of life-threatening allergic
reactions, is a drug/device combination product.149 The mode of action for
the device component (injector pen) is housing the drug and providing access
to the patient’s anatomy.150 The mode of action for the drug component
(epinephrine) is to stop allergic reactions.151 Because the mode of action for
the drug dominates, EpiPens are regulated by the FDA drug center using the
drug approval pathway.152
In cases in which the OCP cannot determine the PMOA, the FDA uses an
algorithm to assign the combination product to an FDA center.153
Specifically, the new combination product is assigned to an FDA center that
oversees the review of combination products that present similar questions
of safety and efficacy.154 If no such reference combination product exists,
the new combination product is assigned to the center that has the most
expertise in assessing the most significant safety and effectiveness questions
that are raised by the new combination product.155
In short, the FDA assigns a specific regulatory pathway and a lead FDA
center to a combination product based on the product’s PMOA.156 If no
145. See Uemura et al., supra note 144, at 808.
146. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1); Assignment of Agency Component for Review of
Premarket Applications, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,754, 58,755 (Nov. 21, 1991) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 3).
147. See Frequently Asked Questions About Combination Products, supra note 144. A
mode of action is the way a product brings about an intended therapeutic action or result. See
21 C.F.R. § 3.2(k) (2022).
148. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1)(C); 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(m) (2022). A therapeutic effect is the
effect of the combination product that is intended to diagnose, cure, treat, or prevent a specific
disease or to affect the structure or any function of the human body. See 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(k)
(2022).
149. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves First Generic Version
of EpiPen (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fdaapproves-first-generic-version-epipen [https://perma.cc/CY9B-HCWU] (explaining that
EpiPens are drug/device combination products).
150. See David Amor, How to Determine A Combination Product’s Primary Mode of
Action (PMOA), MED DEVICE ONLINE (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.meddeviceonline.com/
doc/how-to-determine-a-combination-product-s-primary-mode-of-action-pmoa-0001
[https://perma.cc/27CF-9ZBW].
151. See id.
152. See Press Release, supra note 149.
153. See Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 69 Fed. Reg.
25,527, 25,527 (May 7, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3).
154. See id. at 25,528–29.
155. See id. at 25,529.
156. See Frequently Asked Questions About Combination Products, supra note 144.
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PMOA can be determined, the FDA attempts to assign the product to the
center with the most pertinent regulatory expertise.157
E. Federal Regulation of Human Organs
The ultimate purpose of bioprinted organs is to decrease the demand for
donor organs, which are regulated by the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) under NOTA.158 Passed in 1984, NOTA sought to
address a shortage of donor organs by providing for the establishment of a
fair and efficient organ allocation system.159 NOTA also made the sale of
human organs illegal.160 The Act defines “human organs” as including “the
human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow,
cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof.”161 However, the
secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is
authorized by statute to expand the regulatory definition of a human organ.162
For instance, vascularized composite allografts (i.e., human body parts that
contain multiple tissues including skin, muscle, bone, nerves, and blood
vessels) were added to the definition of human organ in 2013.163 Examples
of vascularized composite allografts include the face or a hand.164
The U.S. government has contracted the United Network for Organ
Sharing (UNOS) to operate as its organ procurement and transplantation
network.165 UNOS ensures transplant safety by specifying the medical
criteria that a donor and recipient have to meet before a transplantation can
occur.166 For instance, organs from donors who exceed a certain age, who
157. See Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 69 Fed. Reg. at
25,529.
158. See generally Robert Jacobson, Note, 3-D Bioprinting: Not Allowed or NOTA
Allowed?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2016).
159. See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 15 (1984); Jacobson, supra note 158, at 1122.
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a).
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1).
162. See id. Both the FDA and the HRSA are part of the HHS. See HHS Organizational
Chart, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/
orgchart/index.html [https://perma.cc/AZ3Y-WRSL] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
163. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,033, 40,033
(July 3, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121). Like certain bioprinted organs, VCAs are
“vascularized and require[] blood flow by surgical connection of blood vessels to function
after transplantation,” “contain[] multiple tissue types,” and are “[t]ransplanted into a human
recipient as an anatomical/structural unit.” 42 C.F.R. § 121.2 (2022). However, VCAs differ
from bioprinted organs in that they are “[r]ecovered from a human donor as an
anatomical/structural unit” and are “[m]inimally manipulated (i.e., processing that does not
alter the original relevant characteristics of the organ relating to the organ’s utility for
reconstruction, repair, or replacement).” Id. Further, VCAs are “[s]usceptible to allograft
rejection, generally requiring immunosuppression that may increase infectious disease risk to
the recipient.” Id.
164. See Axel Rahmel, Vascularized Composite Allografts: Procurement, Allocation, and
Implementation, 1 CURRENT TRANSPLANTATION REPS. 173, 173 (2014).
165. See Fast Facts, UNOS, https://unos.org/about/fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/G7MXQDGN] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
166. See ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, POLICIES 1, 4–6 (2021),
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/eavh5bf3/optn_policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/H65S7MNH].
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are obese, and/or who suffer from certain disqualifying, underlying medical
conditions are not eligible for transplantation.167 Finally, donated organs are
also screened for infectious diseases and compatibility with the recipient’s
immune system.168
II. APPLICATION OF EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS TO
BIOPRINTED ORGANS
Although the first bioprinted organs have already advanced to the clinic,
the FDA has not issued guidance that clearly delineates the regulatory
requirements for these innovative medical products.169 In fact, the agency
explicitly excluded “the use or incorporation of biological, cellular, or
tissue-based products in [three-dimensional printing]” in its 2017 guidance
on three-dimensional printed medical products.170 So far, FDA activities
relating to bioprinting have been limited to soliciting stakeholder feedback,
providing grants to study and improve bioprinting, and conducting research
on additive manufacturing in-house.171 This is problematic because
regulatory uncertainty discourages investment and hampers innovation.172 In
167. See id.
168. See Martin Hertl, Overview of Transplantation, MERCK MANUAL CONSUMER VERSION
(June 2020), https://www.merckmanuals.com/home/immune-disorders/transplantation/
overview-of-transplantation [https://perma.cc/X8VN-9ZUP].
169. See Tesh W. Dagne, Governance of 3D-Printing Applications in Health: Between
Regulated and Unregulated Innovation, 21 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 281, 314 (2020)
(discussing how the lack of regulatory guidance might hinder patient access to bioprinted
organs); Mermin-Bunnell, supra note 11, at 4–5 (discussing clinical trials for bioprinted
bladders); Kelly, supra note 2 (noting that bioprinted organs could be ready for testing in a
few years).
170. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ADDITIVE
MANUFACTURED MEDICAL DEVICES 2 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/97633/download
[https://perma.cc/8MDM-VTKN].
171. See Additive Manufacturing Program: Research on Additive Manufacturing for
Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/medical-device-regulatory-science-research-programs-conducted-osel/additivemanufacturing-program-research-additive-manufacturing-medical-devices
[https://perma.cc/T7HJ-4Y9C] (noting that the FDA device center conducts research on
three-dimensional printing); FDA In Brief: FDA Awards Grants to Foster Innovation for
Advanced Manufacturing Technology as Part of the Agency’s Efforts to Ensure a Robust and
Reliable Supply of Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-brief/fda-brief-fda-awards-grants-foster-innovationadvanced-manufacturing-technology-part-agencys-efforts [https://perma.cc/K5ZB-65AE];
FY 2016 Report from the Director, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20171114005503/https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/ucm535743.htm (noting that the
FDA biologics center held a conference focusing on “3D Modeling and Printing of Tissues
and Organs” in 2016).
172. See Dagne, supra note 169, at 314 (noting that the current lack of a regulatory
framework for bioprinted organs might hamper patient access to these technologies); Amy L.
Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 697, 732 (2014) (discussing that regulatory uncertainty decreases investment);
Will Bioprinted Organs Be Regulated by the FDA Like Medical Devices?, PENROD BLOG,
https://penrod.co/will-bioprinted-organs-be-regulated-by-the-fda-like-medical-devices/
[https://perma.cc/ML45-V3QC] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022) (arguing that current regulations
are inadequate for bioprinting); Damini Kunwar, The Uncertainty of Regulating 3D Organ
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turn, the publication of regulatory guidance, which outlines the criteria under
which the FDA intends to regulate a medical product, has been shown to
significantly reduce approval times.173 As such, guidance from the FDA on
the regulation of bioprinted organs would significantly benefit manufacturers
seeking to develop these innovative products, as well as patients in need of
replacement organs.174
In lieu of guidance specifically addressing the regulation of bioprinted
organs, developers of these products are forced to rely on existing statutory
and regulatory frameworks to predict the regulatory requirements and
exclusivities for their bioprinted products.175 Three different regulatory
frameworks stand out as candidates for governing the regulation of
bioprinted organs: (1) regulation of organs by the HRSA under NOTA, (2)
regulation of cell and tissue products under the PHSA, and (3) regulation of
medical products by the FDA under the FDCA.176
Part II.A explains that significant uncertainty exists as to whether
bioprinted organs fall under NOTA. Part II.B concludes that bioprinted
organs will likely not be subject to the limited regulatory oversight afforded
to certain cell and tissue products. Part II.C discusses that, while most
bioprinted organs will likely be considered combination products, the FDA’s
current approach to combination products may create significant regulatory
uncertainty for the developers of bioprinted organs.
A. Regulation of Bioprinted Organs as Human Organs Under NOTA
The ultimate goal of bioprinted organs is to serve as functional
replacements for donated organs.177 However, it is currently not clear
whether bioprinted organs fall under NOTA’s jurisdiction.178 Clarification
on this issue is critically important for companies seeking to commercialize
bioprinted organs because NOTA prohibits the sale of organs.179 Without
the ability to sell their product, developers of bioprinted organs might not be
able to recoup their development costs and could opt to not develop
bioprinted organs altogether.180
It has been reasoned that bioprinted organs should fall under NOTA’s
jurisdiction because bioprinted organs are biologically and functionally
similar to human organs.181 Similarly, it has been suggested that bioprinted
Printing, REGUL. REV. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/12/10/kunwaruncertainty-regulating-3d-organ-printing/
[https://perma.cc/ER4H-JNWP]
(discussing
concerns that bioprinted organs do not clearly fall into any category of existing law).
173. See Ariel Dora Stern, Innovation Under Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from
Medical Technology, 145 J. PUB. ECON. 181, 181, 194 (2017).
174. See Dagne, supra note 169, at 314.
175. See supra note 172.
176. See supra Parts I.A, I.E.
177. See Kryou et al., supra note 10, at 1–2.
178. See supra Part I.E.
179. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
181. See Lauren M. Lentsch, Kinkos for Your Kidneys: A Legal Blueprint for the
Regulation of Bioprinted Organs, 46 N. KY. L. REV. 43, 54 (2019).
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organs should be regulated under NOTA because they can be derived from
cells that can be considered to be subparts of organs.182
Alternatively, it has been contended that because the statute applies to
human organs, NOTA only applies to organs that are derived from humans
as functional units.183 Here, it is worth noting that in passing NOTA,
Congress made a point to distinguish organ donations from blood donations,
with the latter being minimally invasive and not causing harm to the donor.184
Blood donations are not covered under NOTA.185 Further, some have argued
that NOTA only covers naturally occurring compositions of matter, which
does not include bioprinted organs.186 Finally, it has been suggested that
bioprinted organs do not raise the ethical and human rights concerns that
motivated the passage of NOTA.187 Specifically, NOTA was passed in
response to an increased need for donated organs.188 The legislative history
indicates that Congress was concerned about the moral implications of
citizens auctioning off their organs to the highest bidder for financial gain, a
concern that does not apply to bioprinted organs.189
While the courts have yet to determine whether NOTA applies to
bioprinted organs, the Ninth Circuit in Flynn v. Holder190 examined the
question of whether bone marrow transplants were subject to NOTA.191
Bone marrow, which is explicitly recited in NOTA’s organ definition, can
either be isolated directly from the donor’s bone (in a process called
aspiration) or from the donor’s blood (in a process called apheresis).192 The
court held that bone marrow stem cells obtained through the invasive,
painful, and risky process of aspiration are covered by NOTA.193 However,
bone marrow stem cells present in the blood that could be extracted by
painless and relatively riskless apheresis are not subject to NOTA.194

182. See id. The statutory definition of “human organ” includes “subpart thereof.” 42
U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1).
183. See Elizabeth Kelly, Comment, FDA Regulation of 3D-Printed Organs and
Associated Ethical Challenges, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 523 (2018).
184. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16 (1984) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that “[t]he term ‘human
organ’ is not intended to include replenishable tissues such as blood or sperm”); S. REP. NO.
98-382, at 16–17 (1984) (stating that the organ sale prohibition was not “meant to include
blood and blood derivatives, which can be replenished and whose donation does not
compromise the health of the donor”); National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Com., 98th Cong. 129 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on
H.R. 4080] (statement of Rep. Al Gore).
185. See Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2012).
186. See Anna M. Whitacre, Note, Don’t Go Breakin’ My (3D Bioprinted) Heart:
Dissecting Patentability and Regulation of 3D Bioprinted Organs, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357,
378 (2020).
187. See Kelly, supra note 183, at 525.
188. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 794 (9th Cir. 2002).
189. See Hearing on H.R. 4080, supra note 184.
190. 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012).
191. See id. at 864–65.
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1); Flynn, 684 F.3d at 856–57.
193. See Flynn, 684 F.3d at 859.
194. See id. at 865.
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In response to the court’s ruling, the HHS proposed a new rule that would
have amended the definition of “human organ” in section 301 of NOTA to
clarify that the prohibition on transfers of human organs applies to bone
marrow stem cells regardless of whether they were recovered by aspiration
or by apheresis.195 However, in response to stakeholder feedback, the HHS
withdrew the proposal in 2018 and did not amend NOTA’s organ
definition.196 Given that many bioprinted organs are also generated using
relatively painless and riskless methods, it is possible that bioprinted
organs—like bone marrow stem cells isolated by apheresis—are not subject
to NOTA.197 However, no court has ruled on this issue so far.
In sum, significant regulatory uncertainty exists for manufacturers of
bioprinted organs as to whether their product’s sale will be prohibited under
NOTA.
B. Regulation of Bioprinted Organs as Cell and Tissue Products
Under the PHSA
Alternatively, it might be argued that bioprinted organs are composites of
cells and tissues and should therefore be regulated as cell and tissue products
under the PHSA.198
Only a certain group of cell and tissue products is exempt from premarket
approval, which is otherwise required for drugs, biologics, and medical
devices, and is solely regulated under section 261 of the PHSA.199 To qualify
for this exemption from premarket approval, the cell and tissue products have
to be minimally manipulated and cannot be combined with other substances
other than compounds such as water or sterilizing or storage agents.200 This
Note argues that bioprinted organs are neither minimally manipulated nor
free from other substances and, as such, do not qualify for the exemption.
To generate a human organ using bioprinting, stem cells are isolated from,
for example, a patient’s blood and reprogrammed to develop into the desired
cell types (e.g., heart or skin cells).201 After the cells have been printed into
a three-dimensional structure, they are cultivated under specific conditions
to mature into a functional tissue.202 Given the amount of manipulation
required to turn a patient’s cells into a bioprinted organ, it is likely that
bioprinted organs will not be considered to comprise “minimally

195. See Change to the Definition of “Human Organ” Under Section 301 of the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,810, 60,811–12 (Oct. 2, 2013) (to be codified
at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121).
196. See Change to the Definition of “Human Organ” Under Section 301 of the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984; Withdrawal, 83 Fed. Reg. 60,804, 60,804 (Nov. 27, 2018) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121).
197. See Flynn, 684 F.3d at 865; supra text accompanying notes 4–5.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 3–10, 120–24.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 120–24.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 120–24.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
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manipulated” cells.203 Further, many bioprinted organs use scaffolding
materials, which might still be present in the fully matured bioprinted
organ.204 As such, many bioprinted organs comprise human cells and tissues
that are more than minimally manipulated and have been combined with
substances other than water or storage agents.205 Accordingly, even though
bioprinted organs are technically cell- or tissue-based products, they will
likely not be exempt from the stringent regulatory review that applies to
drugs, biologics, and medical devices.206
C. Regulation of Bioprinted Organs as Medical Products Under the FDCA
Finally, because bioprinted organs are intended to treat disease and affect
a function of the human body, they might reasonably be regulated as medical
products under the FDCA.207 While this Note argues that bioprinted organs
will likely be regulated by the FDA as combination products, the FDA’s
current approach to combination products may still create significant
regulatory uncertainty for the developers of bioprinted organs.
1. Bioprinted Organs Will Likely Be Considered Combination Products
Like other medical products classified as combination products, bioprinted
organs can exhibit characteristics of drugs, biologics, and medical devices.208
For example, bioprinted organs contain living cells, pointing to their
classification as biologics.209 However, depending on the type of bioprinted
organ, the bioprinted material might also exhibit characteristics of a medical
device or drug.210 For instance, the function of a bioprinted cornea is very
much mechanical in nature, pointing to a medical device classification.211
Specifically, the cornea focuses light, filters UV rays, and serves as a physical
barrier that prevents dirt and microorganisms from entering the eye.212
Based on these properties, (non-cellular) artificial corneas have been
classified by the FDA as medical devices.213 Similarly, the function of a
heart is mainly a mechanical one (i.e., the heart circulates blood through the
203. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
supra note 120, at 15 (explaining that the production of cells that cannot differentiate into a
different cell type anymore from blood stem cells is generally considered to be more than
minimal manipulation).
204. See supra text accompanying note 9.
205. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
206. See supra Part I.C.1.
207. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
208. See Kelly, supra note 183, at 527.
209. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
210. See Kelly, supra note 183, at 527.
211. See Corneal Disease, CLEVELAND CLINIC, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/
diseases/8586-corneal-disease [https://perma.cc/FZ3J-NQXB] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022);
supra note 72 and accompanying text.
212. See Corneal Disease, supra note 211.
213. See Premarket Approval (PMA): Intacs Prescription Inserts/Intacs Corneal Implants,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/
pma.cfm?id=P980031 [https://perma.cc/SH7N-DFE6] (last visited Jan. 16, 2022).
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body and maintains blood pressure).214 Accordingly, the FDA has classified
(non-cellular) artificial hearts as medical devices.215
Alternatively, some organs achieve their biological function by secreting
what are essentially small molecule drugs, which in turn fulfill important
functions in the human body.216 For example, hormones secreted by the
thyroid gland regulate the body’s metabolism, as well as cellular activity and
development.217
Because many bioprinted organs will share characteristics of medical
products falling into different regulatory categories, it is likely that the FDA
will classify bioprinted organs as combination products. However, without
additional guidance from the FDA, there is uncertainty as to whether the
existing framework relating to combination products can be effectively
applied to bioprinted organs. Specifically, the assignment of a combination
product to a specific FDA center and approval pathway based on its PMOA
can be particularly challenging for bioprinted organs.218 Further, due to the
inherently interdisciplinary nature of bioprinted organs, it is unclear whether
review by a single FDA center will be sufficient to ensure the safety and
efficacy of these medical products.219
2. Identifying the Most Appropriate FDA Center to Lead the Regulatory
Review of a Bioprinted Organ Can Be Challenging
The FDA’s approach of assigning combination products to a lead center
based on their primary mode of action works well for combination products
in which one regulatory category clearly dominates.220 However, not all
cases are so clear-cut, and sponsors have complained about inconsistencies
in the designation and assignment process.221 For example, although
combination products Dermagraft and MACI are both bioabsorbable

214. See James Beckerman, How the Heart Works, WEBMD (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.webmd.com/heart-disease/guide/how-heart-works
[https://perma.cc/9WVB99AT].
215. See Premarket Approval (PMA): Syncardia Temporary Cardio West Total Artificial
Heart (TAH-T), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/
cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma.cfm?ID=P030011 [https://perma.cc/5UMY-DMMP] (last visited Jan.
16, 2022). TAH-T is a mechanical device consisting of two artificial heart chambers and four
artificial heart valves made of semirigid plastic that can temporarily replace a failing human
heart. See How Does the Syncardia Total Artificial Heart Work?, SYNCARDIA,
https://syncardia.com/patients/patient-resources/how-does-the-total-artificial-heart-work/
[https://perma.cc/UG3Y-R92X] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
216. See Susanne Hiller-Sturmhöfel & Andrezej Bartke, The Endocrine System: An
Overview, 22 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RSCH. WORLD 153, 153 (1998) (discussing the secretion of
hormones by various organs).
217. See id.
218. See infra Part II.C.2.
219. See infra Part II.C.3.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 149–52.
221. See Uemura et al., supra note 144, at 809.
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scaffolds covered with living cells, Dermagraft is regulated as a medical
device, while MACI is regulated as a biologic.222
Because form and function are so highly intertwined in bioprinted organs,
the primary mode of action can be challenging to ascertain for these
products.223 For instance, determining the PMOA for a bioprinted organ
might become a question of how granular one defines the problem to be
solved. Does a bioprinted heart primarily achieve its therapeutic effect by
serving as a mechanical pump, indicating a medical device mode of
action?224 Or is the artificial heart a biologic because the contractile function
of the organ critically depends on the action of the heart cells making up the
organ?225 Similarly, does a bioprinted cornea exhibit a device mode of action
because the cornea functions to focus and filter light and serve as a physical
barrier?226 Or does the product have a biologics mode of action because the
transparency and refractory qualities of a lens are actually the result of lens
crystallins (a type of protein found in the eye), which are produced by the
cells that make up the cornea?227 Accordingly, for many bioprinted organs,
it might not readily be apparent what the primary mode of action will be,
creating uncertainty for sponsors as to which regulatory pathway will apply
to their product and what FDA center will handle the application.228

222. See Letter from Raj Puri, Director, Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Rsch., U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., to Anastacia Bilek, Vericel Corp. (May 31, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/127941/download [https://perma.cc/53SQ-QMXQ] (approving
supplement of Biologics License Application for MACI); Charles E. Hart et al., Dermagraft:
Use in the Treatment of Chronic Wounds, 1 ADVANCES WOUND CARE 138, 141 (2012)
(discussing that Dermagraft is a Class III medical device).
223. See RICCARDO LEVATO ET AL., FROM SHAPE TO FUNCTION: THE NEXT STEP IN
BIOPRINTING 1 (2020) (discussing the intimate linkage between tissue architecture and
function). As acknowledged by the FDA, a combination product can have two or more mode
of actions that equally contribute to the medical product’s overall therapeutic effect. See
Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,848, 49,849
(Aug. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3). For these products, the FDA admits that
assessing the PMOA is “complicated.” Id.
224. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
225. See Dan B. Tran et al., Anatomy, Thorax, Heart Muscles, STATPEARLS (Sept. 18,
2021), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK545195/ [https://perma.cc/ZE4J-PQGL];
supra note 69 and accompanying text. Current regulations on PMOA discuss a scaffold for
organ replacement that has been seeded with a patient’s own cells and that has the shape of
the target organ. See Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 70 Fed.
Reg. at 49,858. According to the regulation, such a product’s PMOA would be attributable to
the biological product component’s action. See id. However, the description of this exemplary
hypothetical product already requires that it is the patient’s own cells that enable the product
to “ultimately function like the target organ in the patient,” thus foreclosing a scenario in which
the combination product has any significant device mode of action. See id. As such, it is
questionable if this example would apply to a bioprinted heart or cornea. See id.
226. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
227. See generally James V. Jester, Corneal Crystallins and the Development of Cellular
Transparency, 19 SEMINARS CELL & DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 82 (2008).
228. See, e.g., BioLife4D Corp., Offering Circular (Form 1-A) (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001714919/000147793220007347/biolife_253g2.
htm [https://perma.cc/44HW-SR6X] (stating to investors that there is no “definitive process
for review and approval of 3D bioprinted devices or tissues”).
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If the FDA cannot identify a PMOA, the combination product is assigned
to a center that reviews other combination products presenting similar
questions of safety and effectiveness.229 However, without more explicit
FDA guidance, sponsors do not know for certain what such reference
combination products would be.230 For instance, a bioprinted product
currently undergoing FDA review is EpiBone-Craniomaxillofacial
(EB-CMF), a bioprinted bone graft for the reconstruction of facial bones.231
EB-CMF is regulated as a biologic-led combination product by the FDA
biologics center.232 Does this mean that all bioprinted organs will be
regulated by the FDA as biologics? BioLife4D, a company that is developing
a fully viable heart ready for transplantation, does not seem to think so.233
The company has emphasized to its stockholders that it believes that its
product will be regulated as a Class III device.234
Without a reference product, the bioprinted combination product is
assigned to the center that has the most expertise to assess the “most
significant safety and effectiveness questions” raised by the combination
product.235 Because the mechanical and biologic properties of a bioprinted
organ are highly interdependent, more than one FDA center might have
regulatory expertise pertinent to the safety and effectiveness of the bioprinted
organ.236 Further, what constitutes the most significant safety and
effectiveness question presented by the combination product requires
consideration of the main therapeutic mode of action of the bioprinted
product.237 Such an inquiry would likely be difficult for bioprinted organs.
In sum, the FDA’s current framework for designating and assigning
combination products based on a PMOA might be challenging to apply to
bioprinted organs.
3. Regulatory Approval of Bioprinted Organs Might Demand Review by
More than a Single FDA Lead Center
In many cases, assigning a single lead center to conduct the regulatory
review of a combination product can significantly streamline the review
process and reduce costs for the sponsor by avoiding the need to submit

229. See supra Part I.D.
230. See supra text accompanying note 169.
231. See Evaluation of EpiBone-CMF for Mandibular Ramus Reconstruction (EB-CMF),
CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Apr. 21, 2021), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03678467
[https://perma.cc/W9EA-B3S9]; David Butcher, EpiBone Embodies Paperless Efficiencies in
Personalized Medicine, MASTERCONTROL (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.mastercontrol.com/
gxp-lifeline/epibone-embodies-paperless-efficiencies-in-personalized-medicine/
[https://perma.cc/WCT3-Q6TK].
232. See Butcher, supra note 231.
233. See, e.g., Offering Circular, supra note 228.
234. See id.
235. See Definition of Primary Mode of Action of a Combination Product, 69 Fed. Reg.
25,527, 25,529–30 (May 7, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3).
236. See supra note 223.
237. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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multiple FDA applications for the same product.238 However, it has also
been suggested that interdisciplinary products also benefit from an
interdisciplinary review.239 This might be particularly true for bioprinted
organs, which are inherently more interdisciplinary than other types of
medical products.240
Most drug development involves more than one scientific discipline, such
as chemistry (for synthesizing the drug), cell biology (for testing the safety
and efficacy of the drug), and medicine (for designing clinical trials).241 In
contrast, even the production of a suitable candidate for a bioprinted organ
requires input from a variety of scientific disciplines.242 Take the production
of a bioprinted heart as an example. A software engineer develops a
three-dimensional model of the heart with guidance from a biophysicist (to
ensure mechanical functionality of the heart) and a physician (to ensure
patient fit).243 A mechanical engineer then uses the model to print suitably
treated cells provided by a cell biologist onto a biocompatible scaffold
delivered by a material scientist.244 Importantly, because the manufacturing
process of the organ’s cellular components can influence the performance of
the scaffold and vice versa, bioprinting requires not only the sequential but
also the simultaneous collaborative efforts of experts from different
disciplines.245
Because the design and manufacturing process for bioprinted organs is so
interdisciplinary, FDA review of these products may require the input of

238. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2020 OCP PERFORMANCE REPORT IV
(2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/154949/download [https://perma.cc/TAF6-KZRN].
239. See Jiaxin Tian et al., Regulatory Perspectives of Combination Products, 10
BIOACTIVE MATERIALS 492, 495 (2021) (discussing that combination products are
interdisciplinary and that regulatory review should match this interdisciplinarity).
240. See John H. Tibbetts, The Future of Bioprinting: Multidisciplinary Teams Seek to
Create Living Human Organs, 71 BIOSCIENCE 564, 564 (2021) (discussing the
interdisciplinarity in bioprinting); Deborah Sliver et al., Research Is the Focus: Bioprinting,
Biofabrication and 3D Bioprinting, RUTGERS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://mbs.rutgers.edu/
articles/research-focus-bioprinting-biofabrication-and-3d-bioprinting
[https://perma.cc/E8FQ-WH59].
241. See generally Richard C. Mohs & Nigel H. Greig, Drug Discovery and Development:
Role of Basic Biological Research, 3 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 651 (2017).
242. See generally Luciano P. Silva, Current Trends and Challenges in Biofabrication
Using Biomaterials and Nanomaterials: Future Perspectives for 3D/4D Bioprinting in 3D
and 4D Printing, in BIOMEDICAL APPLICATIONS: PROCESS ENGINEERING AND ADDITIVE
MANUFACTURING 373 (Mohammed Maniruzzaman ed., 2019).
243. See Emma C. Moran, The Role of Biomechanisms in Liver Tissue Engineering, at 92–
93 (May 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, Wake Forest University), https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/
bitstream/handle/10339/57098/Moran_wfu_0248D_10676.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2355KCWY] (discussing the impact of mechanical parameters such as fluid pressure on the
properties of liver cells); supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
245. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EVALUATION OF DEVICES USED WITH REGENERATIVE
MEDICINE ADVANCED THERAPIES 10 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/120266/download
[https://perma.cc/WQ57-34LT] (discussing interactions between the cellular and device
components of combination products); Silva, supra note 242, at 387; LEVATO ET AL., supra
note 223, at 1.
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experts in different FDA centers.246 This is not per se problematic, assuming
the availability of efficient channels of communication between the different
FDA centers. Yet, both external and FDA-internal studies have found a lack
of expedient communications between different parts of the agency.247 Such
a lack of intra-agency conversation can result in discrepancies as to how the
different centers manage the regulatory review process.248 Additionally, a
lack of intercenter communication can result in inadequate scientific and
regulatory justifications for regulatory decisions pertaining to combination
products.249 While the FDA has taken some steps to improve its intercenter
consult request process, the procedure is still quite complicated, requiring up
to ten administrative steps for a nonroutine intercenter consult.250 Further,
the process requires that either the FDA officer or the sponsor proactively
recognize that certain issues require input from another center and reach out
to the person with the appropriate regulatory expertise.251 However, in
interdisciplinary and novel technologies, regulatory issues might be difficult
to anticipate.252
In sum, the best regulatory fit for bioprinting organs under existing legal
frameworks might be review by the FDA as combination products. Although
there is always some uncertainty as to which regulatory pathway and lead
center a combination product will be assigned to, this might be particularly
true for bioprinted organs. For instance, for bioprinted organs, one might
question the appropriateness of the FDA’s current approach of assigning
combination products to lead centers based on their PMOA. Further, because
bioprinted organs are more interdisciplinary than other combination
246. See Manresa & Meyers, supra note 78, at 42 (noting that FDA scientists with expertise
in drug, biologics, or medical device development are based in different FDA centers).
Regulatory expertise relating to nanotechnology, another highly interdisciplinary technology,
is also scattered among different FDA centers. See Nanotechnology Programs at FDA, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/science-research/science-andresearch-special-topics/nanotechnology-programs-fda
[https://perma.cc/XPD8-QVHY]
(providing an overview of the FDA’s nanotechnology programs); see also infra notes 312–19.
247. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMBINATION PRODUCT REVIEW INTERCENTER
CONSULT PROCESS STUDY 4–5 (2015), https://fda.report/media/94416/Combination-ProductReview-Intercenter-Consult-Process-Study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8D45-5M6M];
COMBINATION PRODUCTS COALITION, IMPROVING PATIENT CARE THROUGH BETTER
COMBINATION PRODUCT REGULATION 1 (2014), http://combinationproducts.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/May-23-2014-CPC-Paper-Improving-Patient-Care.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U2M9-UD72].
248. See COMBINATION PRODUCTS COALITION, supra note 247, at 4 (arguing that the FDA’s
review of combination products lacks consistency and occasionally leads to scientifically
questionable requests for clinical data).
249. See id.
250. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDES, VOLUME IV—AGENCY
PROGRAM DIRECTIVES: COMBINATION PRODUCTS, INTER-CENTER CONSULT REQUEST PROCESS
attach. A (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/81927/download [https://perma.cc/VY6XXJWM] (laying out an up to ten-step process for a consult request from a different center).
251. See id.
252. See Emerging Sciences, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/science-research/about-science-research-fda/emerging-sciences
[https://perma.cc/H9FH-JAQS] (asking the public to educate the FDA on scientific issues that
might impact regulatory review of medical products).
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products, it is even less clear whether review by a single FDA center will be
sufficient to ensure the safety and efficacy of these novel medical products.
III. A PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BIOPRINTED ORGANS
Without more explicit guidance from Congress, the courts, or regulatory
agencies, significant uncertainty remains for developers of bioprinted organs
as to what exact regulatory hurdles their products will face before they can
be marketed.253 Accordingly, to more efficiently promote Congress’s goals
of incentivizing innovation and accelerating patient access to new therapies,
a new regulatory framework for bioprinted organs is needed.254 To that end,
Part III.A explains that bioprinted organs will likely not—and should not—
be regulated as organs under NOTA. Part III.B recommends that the FDA
should establish an interdisciplinary “Center for Bioprinted Organs” to
oversee the safety and efficacy review of these bioprinted materials. Finally,
Part III.C proposes a regulatory scheme that promotes both innovation and
competition in the bioprinting space, thus benefitting industry stakeholders
and patients alike.
A. Bioprinted Organs Should Not Be Regulated as Human Organs
Under NOTA
Given that the goal of bioprinted organs is to serve as fully functional
organ replacements, one might reason that bioprinted organs should fall
under the purview of NOTA, the law that regulates the retrieval and
allocation of human organs.255 This Note argues that such an interpretation
is inconsistent with the statutory language and the problems that NOTA
sought to address.
1. Bioprinted Organs Are Not Covered by NOTA’s Organ Definition
Both the statutory and regulatory definitions of “human organ” support an
interpretation that organs covered by NOTA (1) are biological materials that
have been isolated from a donor as vascularized, functional anatomic units
and (2) do not include artificially generated organs. Likewise, this Note
argues that cells that were isolated from a donor and subsequently grown into
functional bioprinted organs do not fall under NOTA’s purview either.
First, with the exception of bone marrow, all of the human organs
explicitly listed in the statutory definition of “human organ” meet three
criteria. They (1) have been removed invasively from the organ donor, (2)
can be transferred to the recipient “as is” or with minimal manipulation, and
(3) are transplanted either as (a) an entire organ (like the heart) or (b) a
subpart of an organ capable of regrowth into a full organ (like a liver lobe).256
253.
254.
255.
256.
Donor

See supra Part II.
See supra Part I.A; text accompanying notes 169–74.
See supra Part I.E.
See Junko Haga et al., Liver Regeneration in Donors and Adult Recipients After Living
Liver Transplantation, 14 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 1718 (2008) (discussing the
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In contrast, cells isolated from a patient for bioprinting (1) require minimal
invasion to obtain (often just a puncture of a vein), (2) are subject to
significant manipulation, and (3) are not ready to provide any organ
functionality to the recipient when transplanted as is.257
Second, federal regulations provide that the HSRA administers the
transplantation of “vascularized human organs.”258 The term “vascularized”
indicates that the regulations were intended to cover organs that are ready for
implantation, as opposed to cells derived from such organs.259 Consistent
with this view, the FDA’s definition of cell and tissue products intended for
transfer into a human recipient explicitly excludes “vascularized human
organs” for transplantation.260
Third, the regulatory definition of a vascularized composite allograft,
which was added to expand NOTA’s organ definition in 2013, underscores
the notion that human organs covered by NOTA are (1) transferred from
donor to recipient as an anatomical/structural unit and (2) functional after
transplantation, despite the fact that they are minimally manipulated and are
not combined with other articles such as a device.261 In light of the above,
bioprinted organs, which are not recovered from a donor as a functional
anatomic unit, should not be considered organs for the purposes of NOTA.
Even if bioprinted organs themselves are not considered organs under
NOTA, it has been argued that the cells that serve as starting material for the
bioprinted organ are subparts of organs and as such covered by NOTA.262
However, the Ninth Circuit held in Flynn that although bone marrow is
explicitly recited in NOTA’s organ definition, bone marrow cells that are
isolated using relatively noninvasive techniques do not fall under NOTA’s
purview.263 The ruling in Flynn—combined with the HHS’s decision to not
overrule Flynn by regulation—suggests that starting cells to be used for
bioprinting that are obtained from a patient using relatively noninvasive
techniques are not subparts of organs and, as such, are not covered by NOTA.
Further, many bioprinted organs are grown by first isolating stem cells from

regeneration potential of the liver); supra note 161 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of bone marrow, see infra text accompanying note 263.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 5–11.
258. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,033, 40,034
(July 3, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 21).
259. See id.
260. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(1) (2022).
261. See supra note 163.
262. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. Congress amended the definition of
“human organ” in 1988 to include fetal organs. See Health Omnibus Programs Extension of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, § 407, 102 Stat. 3048, 3116 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 274e(c)(1)). Bioprinted organs utilize cells from humans past the fetal stage and as such do
not raise the same concerns that the use of fetal organs raises. See John A. Robertson, Fetal
Tissue Transplants, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 443, 467, 472 (1988); supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
263. See supra Part II.A.
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blood, cells which the Flynn court explicitly held were not considered organs
under NOTA.264
Finally, this Note argues that the language of the remaining statutory text
and NOTA’s legislative history underscore that the law was intended to
address the ethical and human rights concerns that arose from the sale of
human organs to another. Specifically, the statutory language makes clear
that the organ donor and the organ recipient are not the same individual.265
In contrast, a bioprinted organ is manufactured using the patient’s own
biological material for use in the donor herself, eliminating many of the
ethical or human rights concerns that lead to the prohibition of the sale of
human organs.266
Further, when passing NOTA, lawmakers stressed that blood donations
were not covered by NOTA due to the minimally invasive process of
obtaining them.267 As such, the small amounts of biological material (i.e., a
part of a tissue or blood cells) obtained fairly noninvasively from a donor to
be used in bioprinting should not be covered by NOTA either.
In sum, the statutory and regulatory definitions of “human organ,” as well
as the legislative history of NOTA, support the interpretation that bioprinted
organs were not intended to be covered by NOTA.
2. NOTA Is Ineffective in Ensuring a Supply of Safe and Effective
Bioprinted Replacement Organs
In addition to arguing that bioprinted organs will likely not be construed
to fall under NOTA’s jurisdiction, this Note reasons that regulating
bioprinted organs under NOTA is also undesirable, as such regulation would
stifle innovation in bioprinting and fail to ensure the safety and efficacy of
bioprinted organs.268
First, making the sale of bioprinted organs for valuable consideration
illegal under NOTA would be contrary to Congress’s goal of incentivizing
the development of new medical technologies.269 Given the likely very
significant development and manufacturing costs for a fully functional
bioprinted organ, the inability to receive valuable consideration for their
medical product could serve as a powerful deterrent for any for-profit
company (and even nonprofit institution) to engage in the development and
production of bioprinted organs in the first place.270
264. See Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2012); Ong et al., supra note 4,
at 223.
265. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(4) (discussing “donor-patient pair[s]”); id. § 274f(d)(3)
(differentiating between “donating individuals” and the “recipient of the organ”).
266. See Kelly, supra note 183, at 525.
267. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part III.A.1.
269. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e; supra Part I.A.
270. See James Jeffery, 3D Printing Human Organs—But Where’s the Money for It?,
GUARDIAN (July 17, 2013, 8:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/17/
3d-printing-organs-money [https://perma.cc/P7RV-BXUT] (discussing the financial struggles
of companies developing bioprinted organs).
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Second, regulating bioprinted organs under NOTA does not sufficiently
achieve Congress’s goal of protecting patient safety.271 The organization
responsible for the recovery and allocation of human organs takes certain
precautionary measures to promote successful organ transplantation and to
reduce the risk of disease transmission.272 However, compared to the
rigorous safety and efficacy testing that medical products undergo as part of
the FDA approval process, the requirements for ensuring the safety and
efficacy of donated organs are minimal.273
The fact that NOTA does not require extensive safety and efficacy testing
should not be surprising, as such testing in the context of donated organs is
neither possible nor necessary. To start, organs from diseased donors remain
viable only for a short amount of time.274 Thus, the amount of testing that
can be performed on an organ and its donor in this short time frame is very
limited.275
Further, in contrast to artificial biomaterials, medical
professionals can presume that organs extracted from formerly living persons
are generally functional.276 Accordingly, the fact that NOTA does not
require extensive safety and efficacy testing for donated organs is no
particular threat to patient safety.277
However, the situation would be different for bioprinted organs. While a
three-dimensional structure of cells and scaffolding material might be
regulated as an organ for the purposes of NOTA, this does not mean that this
structure actually functions as an organ and will continue to do so for years
after transplantation.278 Given that transplanted organs can last for decades,
nonfunctional or unsafe organ replacements are a significant risk for patient
safety.279
One might argue that the organ allocation network could simply revise the
donor eligibility requirements to incorporate some kind of “organ
functionality test” that would ensure that a bioprinted organ is fit for
transplantation. However, assessing the safety and efficacy of bioprinted
271. See supra Part I.A.
272. See supra Part I.E.
273. See supra Parts I.C.1, I.E.
274. A transplant team usually only has about four to thirty-six hours to evaluate donor
eligibility, obtain authorization for the organ donation, identify a suitable recipient, recover
the organ, transport the organ to the recipient, and transplant the organ into the recipient. See
What Is the Time Frame for Transplanting Organs?, DONOR ALL. (Aug. 25, 2021),
https://www.donoralliance.org/newsroom/donation-essentials/what-is-the-time-frame-fortransplanting-organs/ [https://perma.cc/HC55-Q384].
275. See id.
276. For example, in absence of signs of heart disease, the fact that a donor lived three
decades before dying in a car accident is fairly good evidence that the patient indeed possessed
a functional heart.
277. See supra Part I.E.
278. Cf. supra text accompanying note 181.
279. See S.A. Lodhi et al., Solid Organ Allograft Survival Improvement in the United
States: The Long-Term Does Not Mirror the Dramatic Short-Term Success, 11 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 1126, 1127 fig.1 (2011) (illustrating that organs can function for decades
after transplantation); supra Part I.A. (noting patient safety as one of the main goals of the
FDCA).
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organs requires the expertise of a regulatory team with a wide range of
scientific training.280 The expertise of UNOS, which has been contracted by
the HRSA to serve as the government’s organ allocation network, lies in
facilitating the logistics of obtaining and allocating fully developed human
organs.281 The HSRA, in turn, specializes in providing health-care
infrastructure and services.282 In contrast, the government’s expertise in
evaluating the safety and efficacy of medical products has been firmly
concentrated in the FDA.283 As such, it is likely that neither UNOS nor the
HSRA have the adequate interdisciplinary regulatory expertise required to
assess the safety and efficacy of bioprinted organs.
In sum, because regulation of bioprinted organs under NOTA would stifle
innovation in bioprinting and fail to ensure the safety and efficacy of
bioprinted organs, this Note recommends explicitly excluding bioprinted
organs from NOTA’s jurisdiction.284
B. A New Center for the Regulation of Bioprinted Organs
This Note argues that bioprinted organs should not fall under the purview
of NOTA.285 Instead, they should be regulated by the federal agency with
the most experience in assessing the safety and efficacy of medical products:
the FDA.286 However, which subunit of the FDA should regulate bioprinted
materials? And how can lawmakers incentivize innovation while balancing
the interests of innovator and follow-on companies in the bioprinted organ
space?
Bioprinting is a uniquely interdisciplinary science.287 Yet, FDA
examiners with scientific expertise relevant to the development of bioprinted
materials are currently scattered across three different FDA centers.288 Thus,
this Note proposes the formation of a new “Center for Bioprinted Organs”
within the Office of Combination Products.289 This center would be staffed
with regulatory scientists and experts from the FDA’s drug, biologic, and
device centers, forming an interdisciplinary team. Rather than being
subordinate to these three existing centers, the separate nature of the new
Center for Bioprinted Organs would emphasize its interdisciplinary and

280. See supra Part II.C.3.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 165–68.
282. About HRSA, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/about/index.html
[https://perma.cc/V49Y-FYZH] (last visited Jan. 16, 2022).
283. See supra text accompanying note 35.
284. See Jacobson, supra note 158, at 1140 (proposing language to explicitly exclude
bioprinted organs from NOTA).
285. See supra Part III.A.
286. See supra Part I.A (discussing regulation of medical products by the FDA).
287. See supra Part II.C.3.
288. See supra Part II.C.3.
289. As a practical matter, the new center should have jurisdiction over all bioprinted
materials, including bioprinted tissues. However, the regulation of bioprinted tissues is
beyond the scope of this Note.
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collaborative mission and avoid turf battles between existing centers.290 This
Note argues that using an interdisciplinary team to oversee the approval
process for bioprinted organs is more efficient and safer than the FDA’s
current lead center approach for combination products. Moreover, the
approach proposed by this Note is in line with Congress’s goals of ensuring
the safety and efficacy of medical products while enhancing patient access to
new medical technologies.291
First, an interdisciplinary review of bioprinted organs enhances product
safety by improving the quality of the regulatory review. One of the
hallmarks of bioprinted organs is that interactions between the organ’s living
and inanimate components can have significant impact on the physical,
chemical, and biological properties of the medical product.292 An
appropriately staffed, interdisciplinary team is well suited to recognize and
anticipate the potential safety issues that may arise from the interactions
between the different components of the bioprinted organ.293 Furthermore,
the establishment of a single center dedicated to the regulatory review of
bioprinted organs can lead to a higher-quality review that more quickly
identifies key issues related to safety or efficacy.294 Finally, having a single
center review all market applications for bioprinted organs will increase
consistency in the review process.295
Second, an interdisciplinary review of bioprinted organs is more efficient.
Assigning the review of bioprinted organs to a single center eliminates the
need for an intercenter consult request.296 Despite the FDA’s recent
improvements to the intercenter consult process, it still—quite
inefficiently—requires numerous administrative steps.297 Furthermore, the
consult request process presumes that a reviewer can anticipate issues that
the reviewer might simply not know about (such as issues outside of the
scope of the reviewer’s scientific expertise).298 Finally, an interdisciplinary
FDA team can more efficiently communicate with the sponsor’s

290. See Susan B. Foote & Robert J. Berlin, Can Regulation Be as Innovative as Science
and Technology?: The FDA’s Regulation of Combination Products, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
619, 632–33 (2005) (describing ongoing turf battles among FDA centers).
291. See supra Part I.A.
292. See supra Part II.C.3.
293. See supra Part II.C.3.
294. See Rhonda M. Hearns-Stewart et al., The Integrated Review: FDA Modernizes the
Review of New Drug Marketing Applications, 55 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REGUL. SCI.
467, 469–71 (2021); Qiong Yuan, Accelerating Progress in Pharmaceutical R&D: The
Power of Interdisciplinary Knowledge, CAS (Aug. 8, 2021), https://www.cas.org/resources/
blog/accelerating-progress-pharmaceutical-rd-power-interdisciplinary-knowledge
[https://perma.cc/D5F2-WNDS] (discussing the benefits of using an interdisciplinary
approach to improve FDA regulatory review).
295. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 248–51 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 250–52 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 250–52 and accompanying text.
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development team.299 This more tailored regulatory approach is in line with
Congress’s goal of streamlining the approval of medical products.300
Third, the establishment of a Center for Bioprinted Organs is consistent
with the FDA’s proclaimed commitment to modernizing the FDA’s
organizational structure, eliminating review silos between different scientific
disciplines and adapting existing regulatory approaches to ensure the
efficient evaluation of innovative technologies.301 Indeed, in the past, the
FDA has formed new centers or transferred jurisdiction of certain products
to an FDA team with more fitting regulatory expertise in response to
advancements in medical science.302 Accordingly, this Note’s argument for
the establishment of a Center for Bioprinted Organs serves the FDA’s goal
of matching its organizational structure to the products the agency
regulates.303
Finally, the establishment of a new FDA center to address the lack of
regulatory guidance for bioprinted organs is consistent with Congress’s
mandate requiring the FDA to identify gaps in the regulatory process that
would delay patient access to new medical technologies.304 Indeed,
Congress has specifically endorsed the establishment of Intercenter Institutes
within the FDA to coordinate and streamline the regulatory review of medical
products.305 One of these Intercenter Institutes is the Oncology Center of
Excellence (OCE).306 The OCE focuses on a specific disease area rather than
a specific type of product.307 However, just like the Center for Bioprinted
Organs proposed by this Note, the OCE was designed to take advantage of
the combined interdisciplinary skill set of FDA reviewers with expertise in
drugs, biologics, devices, and diagnostics.308
299. For instance, the FDA’s software expert can directly advise the sponsor’s software
engineer on software-related issues, while the FDA’s cell cultivation expert can discuss
problems with her counterpart on the sponsor’s development team.
300. See William D. Schwieterman, Regulating Biopharmaceuticals Under CDER Versus
CBER: An Insider’s Perspective, 11 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 945, 950 (2006) (arguing that
a more flexible and individualized regulatory approach may avoid unnecessary development
costs and delays); supra Part I.A.
301. See Scott Gottlieb, FDA’s Comprehensive Effort to Advance New Innovations:
Initiatives to Modernize for Innovation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices/fdas-comprehensive-effort-advance-newinnovations-initiatives-modernize-innovation [https://perma.cc/4RPY-8JTM].
302. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 78–79.
304. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 393(g), 393 note (“Advancing Regulatory Science To Promote
Public Health Innovation”).
305. See 21 U.S.C. § 399g.
306. See Implementing The 21st Century Cures Act: A 2018 Update From FDA and NIH,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 24, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/congressionaltestimony/implementing-21st-century-cures-act-2018-update-fda-and-nih-07242018
[https://perma.cc/9Y6Z-YLYP].
307. See Oncology Center of Excellence, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 30, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/oncology-center-excellence
[https://perma.cc/83JC-DKNV].
308. See id. (noting that the Oncology Center of Excellence “leverages the combined skills
of regulatory scientists and reviewers with expertise in drugs, biologics, devices, and
diagnostics”).
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Some might argue that the FDA cannot establish a new center in response
to every advancement made in biomedical science. Patient advocacy groups
and members of Congress are already advocating for the formation of FDA
centers that would advance the interests of their respective constituents, such
as a Neuroscience Center of Excellence.309 Further, forming a new FDA
center constitutes a significant administrative and financial burden for an
already cash-strapped agency.310 Finally, relocating FDA employees from
their current roles into a new work environment (organizationally and
potentially physically) may lead employees to leave the agency.311
This Note does not dispute that amending a regulatory framework in
response to technological change can be expensive and laborious. However,
policy makers have appreciated that certain interdisciplinary technologies
have the potential to provide groundbreaking benefits to patients and are thus
deserving of increased attention and funding.312
One of these
groundbreaking technologies is nanotechnology, which refers to the design
of structures that exhibit new properties and functions due to their very small
size.313 Per Congress’s direction, the FDA established a Nanotechnology
Task Force dedicated to building regulatory expertise concerning the safety
and efficacy of nanotechnology products and facilitating innovation in the
field.314 Since then, Congress has directed the FDA to further intensify and
expand the agency’s efforts to build scientific expertise on nanomaterials.315
Like nanotechnology, bioprinting is an inherently interdisciplinary
technology that combines aspects of chemistry, biology, and physics.316
Further, like nanotechnology, bioprinting is used in a variety of different
products that include aspects reviewed by more than one FDA product
center.317 Finally, like nanotechnology, bioprinting is a disruptive
technology with the potential to revolutionize health care.318
309. See Advocate for an FDA Neuroscience Center of Excellence!, AM. BRAIN COAL.,
https://www.americanbraincoalition.org/page/NCOE [https://perma.cc/KKU9-7WAZ] (last
visited Mar. 4, 2022).
310. See generally Judith Alphonse et al., The FDA Funding Crisis, 30 J. PHARMACY TECH.
57 (2014) (discussing the FDA’s historic underfunding).
311. See Bob Carlson, FDA: Change Is Good, BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE, March
2004, at 27, 29 (expressing worry that after a reorganization of the FDA drug and biologics
centers, employees may leave the agency).
312. See 15 U.S.C. § 7501 (directing the president to implement a National
Nanotechnology Program).
313. See Sangeeta Khare et al., Nanotechnology, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD
MICROBIOLOGY 893, 893 (Carl A. Batt & Mary Lou Tortorello eds., 2d ed. 2014). For
reference, a sheet of paper is about 100,000 nanometers thick. See Anne Marie Helmenstine,
Examples of Nanoscale Objects, THOUGHTCO (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/
examples-of-nanoscale-608575 [https://perma.cc/6KTC-XJ97].
314. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NANOTECHNOLOGY—OVER A DECADE OF PROGRESS
AND
INNOVATION
1,
11
(2020),
https://www.fda.gov/media/140395/download
[https://perma.cc/KE9L-82LZ].
315. See 21 U.S.C. § 399e.
316. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 314, at 11; supra Part II.C.3.
317. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 314, at 11; supra Part II.C.3.
318. See THOMAS H. JOVIC ET AL., 3D BIOPRINTING AND THE FUTURE OF SURGERY 8 (2020)
(arguing that 3D printing and bioprinting have the potential to be the “single biggest

2384

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

Accordingly, the establishment of a new center dedicated to building
regulatory expertise in bioprinting is consistent with Congress’s tradition of
singling out specific technologies that can significantly benefit public
health.319
C. Balancing the Interests of Innovator and Follow-on Companies in the
Bioprinting Space
Because regulatory exclusivities can be powerful tools to incentivize the
development of new medical technologies, this Note proposes utilizing a
relatively long regulatory exclusivity period to promote innovation in the
bioprinting space.320 However, to balance the interests of innovator and
follow-on companies in the context of bioprinted organs, this Note
recommends promoting competition by disclosing the innovator company’s
manufacturing information to manufacturers seeking to market a follow-on
product.321
1. Bioprinted Organs Should Be Awarded a Long Regulatory
Exclusivity Period
Innovation is often expensive and risky.322 Regulatory exclusivities
promote innovation by allowing innovator companies to charge significantly
higher prices during the exclusivity period (far more than they would be able
to with competitors in the market).323 Importantly, Congress sought to
balance the benefits afforded to innovator companies by making it easier for
competitor companies to enter the market once the exclusivity period had
expired.324 In the small molecule context, offering both regulatory
exclusivity as well as an abbreviated pathway to FDA approval has been
shown to effectively promote drug development by innovator companies and
to encourage competition among generic manufacturers at the end of the
exclusivity period.325 However, there is a debate on whether long exclusivity
technological disruptor” for the design and delivery of health care in the twenty-first century);
Angelo Young & Michael B. Sauter, 3D Printing, E-cigarettes Among the Most Important
Inventions of the 21st Century, USA TODAY (Jan. 9, 2020, 8:02 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/01/09/21-most-important-inventions-of-the21st-century/40934825/ [https://perma.cc/G5WX-RQK5] (listing three-dimensional printing
as one of the most important inventions for the twenty-first century); The Global 3D Printing
Market Size Is Expected to Grow USD 12.6 Billion in 2021 to USD 34.8 Billion by 2026, at a
CAGR
of 22.5 Percent, REPORTLINKER
(Aug.
3,
2021, 4:23
AM),
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/08/03/2273364/0/en/The-global-3Dprinting-market-size-is-expected-to-grow-USD-12-6-billion-in-2021-to-USD-34-8-billionby-2026-at-a-CAGR-of-22-5.html [https://perma.cc/YLS3-MMV4].
319. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 314, at 3.
320. See supra Part I.C.2.
321. See generally Heled, supra note 115, at 62 (advocating for making innovator
manufacturing information available to follow-on developers in the context of biologics).
322. See supra note 119; text accompanying note 172.
323. See supra Part I.C.2.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 106–19.
325. See CONRAD & LUTTER, supra note 110, at 2–3; Heled, supra note 106, at 115, 117,
120–21.
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periods, such as the twelve-year exclusivity period for biologics, actually
promote innovation or stifle competition.326 This Note concludes that a
longer exclusivity period is necessary to promote innovation in the bioprinted
organ space.
When applying the concerns of innovation and competition to bioprinted
organs, one should consider that bioprinted organs and their associated
manufacturing processes are significantly more complex than biologics and
their manufacturing processes.327 This is important for two reasons.
On the one hand, innovator companies producing bioprinted organs might
face even higher financial and technological hurdles in bringing their
technologies to market as compared to innovator companies producing
biologics or drugs.328 Accordingly, one might argue that bioprinted organs
should benefit from an even longer regulatory exclusivity period, as
compared to biologics and drugs.329
On the other hand, Congress sought to balance the long exclusivity period
awarded for new biologics by allowing biosimilar manufacturers to rely on
the innovator’s safety and efficacy data once the exclusivity period had
expired.330 However, the FDA is currently not allowed to disclose the
innovator’s manufacturing protocol to follow-on applicants.331 As such,
manufacturers of biosimilars are forced to spend significant resources on
developing their own manufacturing process.332 Additionally, many
biosimilar manufacturers incur significant costs for conducting clinical trials
to establish that the product generated with their independently developed
manufacturing process exhibits biosimilarity to the reference product.333
These problems will likely be exacerbated for the manufacturers of follow-on
bioprinted organs, which have to devise manufacturing protocols and
demonstrate similarity for a significantly more complex medical product.334
Additionally, given the semipermanent nature of bioprinted organs once
transplanted into a recipient, biosimilarity to the reference product will need
to be examined over an extended period of time.335 This can further increase
the costs of clinical trials needed to bring a follow-on bioprinted organ to
market.336
Accordingly, follow-on manufacturers of bioprinted organs might not
experience the significant cost savings that Congress had envisioned for

326. See supra text accompanying notes 138–40.
327. See supra Part II.C.1.
328. See Jeffery, supra note 270; Mermin-Bunnell, supra note 11, at 4–5 (noting that the
company developing a bioprinted bladder, the first bioprinted organ to be transplanted into a
human, filed for bankruptcy in 2014).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 132, 139.
330. See supra Part I.C.2.
331. See supra Part I.C.1.
332. See supra Part I.C.1.
333. See supra Part I.C.2.
334. See supra Parts I.C.1, II.C.1.
335. See Silva, supra note 242, at 387–88.
336. See supra Part I.C.1.
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follow-on companies filing an abbreviated FDA application.337 Thus,
affording a long exclusivity period to bioprinted organs could result in a
situation in which innovator companies benefit from an extended monopoly
period, but in which follow-on manufacturers struggle to recoup the benefits
of the abbreviated approval process that was supposed to promote
competition among manufacturers.
One way of restoring the balance between innovator and follow-on
companies in the bioprinting arena might be to grant a relatively short
exclusivity period to innovator companies while largely dispensing with the
accelerated pathway for follow-on manufacturers. This way, the innovator
company would still be rewarded for being the first to bring a product to
market while follow-on manufacturers would not be barred from entering the
market for extended periods of time.338 The latter could increase competition
and result in lower prices for patients.339 However, given the significant
development costs for successfully bringing a bioprinted organ to market, a
relatively short exclusivity period might be insufficient to justify a
company’s investment into the development of a bioprinted organ in the first
place.340 Indeed, studies show that the length of the exclusivity period is one
of the largest factors in determining return on investment for pharmaceutical
companies.341
Accordingly, to stimulate innovation in the bioprinted organ space, this
Note proposes a regulatory exclusivity period for bioprinted organs that is at
least as long as the regulatory exclusivity period for a biologic (i.e., at least
twelve years).342 A long period of market exclusivity will allow innovator
companies to recoup the substantial costs incurred by bringing the first
bioprinted organ to market. This in turn helps a large number of patients
awaiting organ transplants, who will only benefit from bioprinted organs if
these products are actually developed and successfully shepherded through
the FDA approval process.343

337. See supra Part I.C.2.
338. This assumes that there is no patent protection on the innovator product, a topic that
is beyond the scope of this Note.
339. See supra text accompanying note 110.
340. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
341. See Chris P. Miller, Increasing Market Exclusivity for New Drugs, the Cure for What
Ails Us?, 3 ACS MED. CHEMISTRY LETTERS 437, 437 (2012); Matthew J. Higgins et al., The
Role of Assets in Place: Loss of Market Exclusivity and Investment 25–26 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27588, 2020) (discussing the relevance of market exclusivity
for a company’s capital expenditures and research and development spending).
342. See supra Part I.C.2.
343. See Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1: An Overview of
Approval Processes for Drugs, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170, 170 (2016)
(describing the length and costs of the drug approval process); supra text accompanying note
18.
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2. The FDA Should Disclose Manufacturing Information for the Reference
Product to Follow-on Companies
The award of a long exclusivity period can be a significant incentive for
innovator companies to bring the first bioprinted organs to market.344
However, this Note argues that regulatory exclusivity alone is unlikely to
increase competition among follow-on manufacturers of bioprinted organs,
which is required to eventually drive down prices for these medical
products.345 Accordingly, this Note recommends pairing a long exclusivity
period for bioprinted organs with permission for the FDA to use the innovator
company’s data in the evaluation of applications by follow-on
manufacturers.346 Similarly, the FDA should be permitted to disclose the
innovator company’s manufacturing information to a manufacturer applying
for FDA approval for a follow-on product.347 Disclosure of manufacturing
information for the reference product has the potential to significantly reduce
financial, regulatory, and scientific burdens for follow-on companies seeking
to enter the market once the exclusivity period has expired.348 This in turn
can promote competition, which eventually benefits patients.349
Importantly, this Note’s proposal is consistent with Congress’s goal of
increasing patient access to much-needed, innovative medical
technologies.350 First, this Note’s proposal significantly lowers the entry
barriers for follow-on manufacturers by providing these companies with the
manufacturing information needed to create a close copy of the innovator
organ.351 For many biological products, the way of manufacture is the
product.352 Accordingly, the more closely a follow-on company can adapt
its manufacturing process to the process used by the innovator company, the
more likely it is that the follow-on company can establish clinical
equivalency with the innovator product.353 This in turn would allow the
follow-on company to rely on the innovator’s safety and efficacy data and to
submit an abbreviated FDA application, resulting in significant cost savings
for follow-on manufacturers of a bioprinted organ.354 Increased competition
344. See supra Part I.C.2.
345. See generally Heled, supra note 106 (predicting that the Biologics Act will unlikely
be as successful in reducing prices as compared to the Hatch-Waxman Act).
346. See Heled, supra note 115, at 62 (discussing the disclosure of manufacturing
information in the context of biologics).
347. See id.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 106–10.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 106–10.
350. See supra Part I.A.
351. See supra Part I.C.1.
352. See Krista H. Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 708–09 (2010); Donna
M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing an
Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics in the United States, 35 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 555, 561 n.21 (2008).
353. See supra Part I.C.1.
354. See Heled, supra note 115, at 62 (suggesting that making innovator manufacturing
information available to biosimilar developers will significantly decrease costs for follow-on
developers to enter the market).
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can ultimately result in lower prices for patients.355 Accordingly, combining
long exclusivity periods for innovator bioprinted organs with a requirement
to disclose manufacturing data to follow-on manufacturers meets Congress’s
desire to balance the interests of innovator and follow-on companies.356
Second, there is statutory precedent for making manufacturing information
available to follow-on manufacturers.357 Under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act358 (FIFRA), manufacturers of pesticides
need to receive clearance from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) before selling their products in interstate commerce.359 As with
medical products, marketing approval for pesticides requires the submission
of data demonstrating the safety and benefits of the pesticide product.360
Further, similar to the regulatory exclusivity period for medical products,
FIFRA provides for a ten-year data exclusivity period for the information
that the innovator company submitted to the EPA for the purpose of obtaining
marketing approval.361
Importantly, after expiration of the data exclusivity period, the EPA is free
to use the innovator company’s data when evaluating applications by
follow-on manufacturers.362 The EPA may also disclose the innovator
company’s information to follow-on manufacturers (regardless of whether
the data includes trade secrets) if certain criteria are met.363 This measure
sought to eliminate the expensive duplication of research and make products
available to consumers more quickly.364
Similar to FIFRA, this Note proposes to balance the interests of innovator
and follow-on companies by combining a longer data exclusivity period (i.e.,
longer than a decade) with a requirement to disclose the innovator product’s
manufacturing information to follow-on manufacturers.365 Under FIFRA,
the EPA may disclose priority data relating to the innovator product only if
the EPA has determined that the disclosure is required to protect public health
or the environment from an unreasonable risk of injury.366 This Note does
not suggest imposing such an additional requirement for making innovator
data available to follow-on manufacturers of bioprinted organs. In fact, in
the context of biosimilar regulation, it has been argued that the requirement
to conduct additional clinical trials to obtain regulatory approval for a
355. See id.
356. See supra Part I.C.2.
357. See generally Heled, supra note 115.
358. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y.
359. See id. § 136a(a).
360. See id. § 136(bb); supra Part I.C.1.
361. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F).
362. See id. §§ 136a(c)(1)(F)(iv), 136h(d)(1).
363. See id. §§ 136a(c)(1)(F)(iv), 136h(d)(1). Specifically, the agent may disclose priority
data relating to the innovator product if the agency has determined that the disclosure is
“necessary to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” Id.
§ 136h(d)(1)(C).
364. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015 (1984).
365. See Heled, supra note 115, at 59 (discussing the balance of interests that FIFRA sought
to achieve).
366. See 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(1).
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biosimilar (after clinical trials conducted by the innovator company have
already established that the product is safe) is an unreasonable violation of
established international ethical standards for conducting biomedical
research.367 As such, avoiding unnecessary clinical trials for bioprinted
follow-on products arguably protects patients from an unreasonable risk of
injury, thus meeting FIFRA’s disclosure requirement.368
Further,
minimizing the number of clinical trials that need to be conducted for a single
medical product is fully in line with Congress’s and the FDA’s primary goal
of protecting public health.369 As such, FIFRA’s disclosure-limitation clause
should not be required for manufacturing information relating to bioprinted
organs.
Some might argue that the FDA’s disclosure of manufacturing data to
follow-on manufacturers, as proposed by this Note, constitutes an
uncompensated taking of the innovator company’s proprietary information
and is thus unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.370
However, in the context of pesticide regulation, the U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld FIFRA’s data use and disclosure provisions as constitutional.371 In
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,372 the Court acknowledged that the health,
safety, and environmental data submitted to the EPA can constitute highly
valuable trade secret information that might be very costly to develop.373
Nevertheless, the Ruckelshaus Court held that as long as the conditions of
data submission to a federal agency were clearly communicated to innovator
companies and as long as these conditions were related to a legitimate
governmental interest, the voluntary data submission in exchange for the
economic benefit of regulatory exclusivity and market registration was not a
“taking” of data.374 Additionally, the Court held that even if the disclosure
and use of the innovator’s data by the EPA was considered a taking, such
taking would be made for “public use” and would as such be permitted.375
In justifying the public use of FIFRA’s disclosure provision, the Court relied

367. See Letter from Bernard Sanders, U.S. Senator, to Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/biogenerics/
sandersletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD4E-2ZBQ] (arguing that the requirement to conduct
additional clinical trials to obtain regulatory approval for a biosimilar product after the
innovator product has been shown to be safe is an unreasonable violation of established
international ethical standards for conducting biomedical research).
368. See 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d)(1).
369. See supra Part I.A.
370. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000–01 (1984) (discussing whether
the disclosure of the health, safety, and environmental data that the innovator company
submitted to the EPA constitutes an unjustified taking under the Fifth Amendment).
371. See Heled, supra note 115, at 60 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ruckelshaus).
372. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
373. See id. at 998.
374. See id. at 1007.
375. See id. at 1014–15.
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on public policy goals that would equally apply to the disclosure of
manufacturing information for bioprinted organs.376
In sum, pairing a long exclusivity period for innovator bioprinted organs
with the disclosure of manufacturing information to follow-on manufacturers
might be a viable option for balancing the interests of innovator and
follow-on companies and encouraging both innovation and competition in
the bioprinting space.377
CONCLUSION
Bioprinted organs have the potential to serve as lifesaving organ
replacements for thousands of patients in need. While science advances
quickly in the bioprinting space, there is significant uncertainty as to how
existing regulatory frameworks would be applied to these innovative medical
products. It is also unclear whether these frameworks would sufficiently
address the specific regulatory needs of bioprinted organs, which are
unusually interdisciplinary materials. Importantly, the lack of specific
regulatory guidance for bioprinted organs could stifle innovation in this
promising technological field, ultimately harming patients.
This Note argues that explicitly excluding bioprinted organs from the
jurisdiction of NOTA, which prohibits the sale of human organs, would
reduce regulatory uncertainty for developers of bioprinted organs.
Additionally, in line with the FDCA’s primary goals of ensuring the safety
and efficacy of medical products, this Note proposes the establishment of a
new FDA center with the interdisciplinary expertise needed to provide
high-quality regulatory review of bioprinted organs. Finally, to meet
Congress’s goal of improving patient access to cutting-edge technologies, a
regulatory framework that promotes innovation while minimizing barriers to
entry for follow-on manufacturers in the bioprinting space is needed.
Specifically, this Note advocates for awarding a long regulatory exclusivity
period to the first innovator company to bring a specific bioprinted organ to
market. Such exclusivity would be paired with a requirement for the
innovator company to disclose the manufacturing information for the
reference product to follow-on manufacturers, thus allowing for a less costly
and more streamlined production of follow-on bioprinted organs once the
exclusivity period has expired.
While significant scientific hurdles in the production of fully functional,
ready-to-implant bioprinted organs remain, more clinical trials are expected
in the next couple of years. Thus, policy makers should act now to provide

376. See id. at 1015 (noting that FIFRA’s disclosure requirement would reduce expensive
duplication of research, streamline the regulatory approval process, accelerate consumer
access to new products, lower barriers to market entry for follow-on manufacturers, and
increase competition among manufacturers).
377. See Heled, supra note 115, at 62–64 (discussing what legislative change might be
required on a practical level to introduce a data disclosure requirement in the context of
biologics regulation).
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the regulatory framework needed to realize the full potential of this exciting
technology for the benefit of patients.

